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Abstract 
111 early Heidegger, the problem of ground is one of the few problems that received 
less attention from scholars. The reason behind is not hard to conceive. In Being and 
Time (1927) and the works before, the concept of ground is neither posed explicitly as 
a problem nor appears frequently as a core term. However, in the years immediately 
after the publication of Being and Time, Heidegger discussed the problem of ground 
extensively. Discussion appears in The Metaphysical Foundation of Logic (1928) and 
On the Essence of Ground (1929). In these two works, the problem of ground is 
formulated as the problem of transcendence. If transcendence is a peculiar feature of 
Daseiii, then what Heidegger attempts is to relate the problem of ground to Dasein 
analysis. And Dasein analysis is precisely the focus of early Heidegger. 
The problem of ground in early Heidegger is radically different from the traditional 
one. Traditional philosophers believe that there is an ultimate ground for everything. 
ii 
Ultimate ground is something that grounds everything while it is not grounded by 
anything else. It is at the end of a series and provides the final reason. They believe 
that once an ultimate ground is found, everything is explained with full clarity. This 
tendency can be found in Aristotle's first cause, Descartes's Archimedean point of 
knowledge, and Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason. Thus, the traditional problem 
of ground can be characterized as a search for ultimate ground. Nevertheless, 
Heidegger takes a step backwards and asks how something like ground is possible in 
Dasein. And this condition of possibility is the transcendence of Dasein. 
Unlike any isolated subject or consciousness, Dasein always dwells in a world 
involving other things and Daseins. World is primarily a referential whole rather than 
a totality of beings. Hence, world belongs to ontological level rather than ontic level. 
Beings are accessible to Dasein only when they have entered into Dasein's world. 
World is accessible to Dasein provided that Dasein has surpassed beings as whole. 
This surpassing is what transcendence means. Through the opening up of world in 
transcendence, beings manifest themselves and are able to be the ground of something. 
However, Dasein is always being thrown into a world. There is no ground for why 
this particular Dasein situates in this world rather than in that world. Consequently, 
the ground of ground is groundless. Ultimate ground is only an illusion of human 
reason. By retrieving the problem of ground in early Heidegger, the conception of 
ultimate ground is reconsidered. 
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Introduction 
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...but it is always possible to say "Why?" 
"Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 92b 24-25 
Ground {Grund) is one of the few concepts that receive less attention from Heidegger 
scholars. The reason behind is not hard to conceive. Compared to other concepts 
such as Being, truth, world, death etc, ground does not receive much independent 
treatment in Heidegger. Even though this concept recurrently appears in different 
contexts, it is often subordinated under other problematic and not thematically 
discussed. Hence, commentaries seldom take up the concept of ground in Heidegger 
for discussion. Nevertheless, ground indeed plays a significant role throughout 
Heidegger's life. 
In later Heidegger, the importance of ground can easily be seen with its relation to 
Being {Sein). Being is that which grounds beings. At the same time, Being is itself 
groundless and without a reason. In contrast to the traditional metaphysics' attempt to 
2 
render an ultimate ground for beings, Heidegger struggled to show, at bottom, beings 
are without a ground or reason why, if it is grounded in Being at all. In The Principle 
of Ground {Der Satz vom Grund), this thread of thought is thematically posed. There 
Heidegger urges readers to listen to an alternative meaning of the principle of ground. 
Principle of ground suggests nothing is without a ground. Or put it positively, 
everything has its ground. However, Heidegger draws our attention to the relation 
between nothing and ground, and accordingly, reinterprets the meaning of the 
principle as nothing is that which without ground. If Being is nothing in the sense of 
"no beings", then it is precisely Being is without ground. By identifying Being with a 
groundless ground, Heidegger finds a way for overcoming traditional metaphysics as 
onto-theo-logy {Onto-theo-logie) and breaks through to the question of Being. 
Therefore, ground is a useful concept to get into Heidegger's later thought. 
Consequently, when commentators explicate the concept of ground in Heidegger, 
their resources are mainly drawn from the writings in later Heidegger. 
The case in early Heidegger is very different. Ground is a rather marginal concept 
which appears occasionally in his early writings. For example, in Being and Time 
{Sein und Zeit), Heidegger's most celebrated work, ground is only mentioned 
explicitly in part 2 when discussing guilt (Shuld). Heidegger explains the existential 
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concept of guilt in terms of Being-the-ground of a nullity (Grundsein enier 
Nichtigkeit)} But he stops to further elaborate what ground means and how it links 
up with Dasein. By the very fact that ground is not thematized as a problem in this 
opus magnum and the writings before, the problem of ground in early Heidegger 
remains in mist. 
Immediately after the publication of Being and Time, there are two pieces of works 
by Heidegger that we must not overlook. The first one is a treatise called On the 
Essence of Ground (Vom Wesen des Grundes). It is written in 1929 and collected in 
Pathmarks {Wegmarken). In this short but concise treatise, Heidegger thematically 
investigates the problem of ground and shows its relation to transcendence of Dasein. 
The second one is a lecture course delivered by Heidegger at Marburg in the summer 
of 1928, and later published as The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic 
{Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz). This lecture is 
set out to ponder upon the ontological presuppositions of logic by interpreting 
Leibniz's doctrine of logic anew. As the interpretation proceeds, Heidegger provides 
a more elaborated and extensive explication of the problem of ground than that in On 
the Essence of Ground. These two pieces of works are valuable references if we are 
‘In Macquarrie and Robinson's translation, Grundsein einer Nichigkeit is rendered as Being-the-basis 
of a nullity. I prefer Being-the-ground as a translation of Grundsein here, since it lets us see more 
clearly the connection between guilt and ground. 
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to penetrate the problem of ground in early Heidegger. 
One of the crucial differences between the problem of ground in early and later 
Heidegger lies at the perspective from which the problem is posed. As Dasein 
analysis dominates the thought of early Heidegger, in both On the Essence of Ground 
and The Metaphysical Foundation of Logic, ground is explicated in relation to 
various existentiales of Dasein that have already explored in Being and Time, for 
instance, world, truth, projection, etc. Hence, the problem of ground in early 
Heidegger is posed from the perspective of Dasein. Nevertheless, in later Heidegger, 
Dasein analysis is abandoned as the point of departure to the question of Being. As 
Heidegger attempts to speak of Being itself, any approach starting from the 
perspective of Dasein still be trapped within this perspective, and thus hinders his 
final aim. Therefore, instead of posing the problem of ground from the perspective of 
Dasein, it is posed from the perspective of Being. 
In The Principle of Ground {Der Satz vom Grund) Heidegger criticizes his own 
attempt in On the Essence of Ground as a "false thoroughness".^ The latter treatise is 
considered as approaching the "essence" of ground by relying on a particular being, 
2 Martin Heidegger, Trans. Reginald Lilly, The Principle of Reason. (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1991), p.48. 
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namely Dasein, and thus easily falls into the error of Dasein-centrism, turning away 
from ground as Being itself. Although the later Heidegger abandons his early 
approach to the problem of ground, we may disagree with him and retrieve those 
insights found in his early treatment. Indeed, Dasein analysis in early Heidegger may 
be the most appreciated part of his philosophy as whole. Its influence extends to the 
realm of existentialism (though Heidegger keeps distance himself from being an 
existentialist), liermeneutics, and post-modernism. The analysis of Dasein 
revolutionizes our traditional concept of human nature, death, truth, world, everyday 
life, etc, and shields light on a genuine grasp of human condition. All of these 
achievements are valuable despite of the criticism from later Heidegger, and so as on 
the problem of ground. In fact, to retrieve the problem of ground in early Heidegger 
is to base the problem on this influential Dasein analysis and lay bare its possible 
implications. 
Ground, unlike other well known terminologies describing Dasein, is not a term that 
exclusively belongs to Heidegger. It has its own history long since the ancient Greek 
as arche (origin) and aition (cause). Later in medieval scholastic philosophy, it is 
rendered as ratio, and in modern philosophy as reason or Vernuft. These 
philosophical terms can be included in the concept of ground although their concrete 
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content may vary. This is taken by Heidegger as a fact no matter in his early or later 
writings. Indeed, philosophy and science {Wis sens chaff) are disciplines that seek 
ground to explain various phenomena. In other words, something like ground 
belongs essentially to philosophy and science. However, when Heidegger poses the 
problem of ground as the problem of transcendence in On the Essence of Ground and 
The Metaphysical Foundation of Logic’ he deviates from any traditional approach. 
Heidegger shifts the problem from a searching for an explanatory ground to an 
analysis of how such searching for ground is possible in Dasein.^ But if he succeeds 
to show that all grounds are indeed grounded in Dasein, then he will reach a striking 
conclusion that runs against our ordinary way of thinking. When the possibility of 
ground in Dasein becomes clear enough, we shall see that, ultimately, all grounds are 
indeed groundless. At last, the search for ground will fall into an "abyss of ground". 
Therefore, the significance of explicating the problem of ground in early Heidegger 
is two-folded. On one hand, such attempt retrieves a neglected part of Dasein 
analysis, namely the connection between Dasein and ground. By clarifying the 
meaning of ground, the meaning of different concepts in early Heidegger that coined 
with the prefix ground-, such as fundamental attunement {Grundstimmung) and 
fundamental concepts {Grundhegriff), will also be clarified. This is something 
3 Catriona Hanley further determines this shift as a transition "away from theory and towards 
phenomenological description of human poietical involvement with entities". See Being and God in 
Aristotle and Heidegger: The Role of Method in Thinking the Infmte, p. 183. 
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important within Heidegger's philosophy. On the other hand, and more importantly, 
such attempt will radicalize one of the implications of Dasein analysis on the 
problem of ground. This will definitely lead us to reconsider a common tendency of 
human beings to search for an ultimate ground. This is something important beyond 
Heidegger's philosophy. 
The aim of this thesis is to explore the problem of ground in early Heidegger. 
Discussion is divided into three chapters. In the first chapter, we will try to clarify 
Heidegger's unique approach to the problem of ground by identifying it to the 
problem of transcendence, with a comparison to the problem of ground in traditional 
philosophy. In the second chapter, we will unfold the concept of Dasein, world, and 
the meaning of being-in-the-world as disclosedness, in order to prepare conceptual 
tools for discussing the problem of transcendence. In third chapter, we will explicate 
the meaning of transcendence and its implication on the problem of ground. 
8 
Chapter 1 
The Problematic of Ground 
9 
The problem of ground is set forth by Heidegger explicitly in On the Essence of 
Ground and the second part of The Metaphysical Foundation of Logic, The problem 
of ground is explicated as an investigation of the essence of ground {Wesen des 
Grundes). As Heidegger repeatedly reminds us, inquiring the essence of ground 
means neither searching for a particular ground for something, nor formulating an 
abstract and universal definition of ground. Instead, he is "looking for insight into 
that which ground as such means, for the way ground as such is intrinsically possible, 
and that means how it is metaphysical necessary." [MFL 213] Heidegger attempts to 
ask, in a Kantian manner, how something like ground is possible. As we shall see 
later, this possibility lies nowhere else but Dasein. Therefore, a complete formulation 
of the problem of ground in early Heidegger is "how is ground possible in Dasein"? 
Posing the problem of ground from the perspective of Dasein leads to significant 
implications. If any ground is only possible in Dasein, then Dasein must be 
understood as more fundamental, as the ground of ground. However, this does not 
mean Heidegger proceeds in a way similar to the search for ultimate ground in 
traditional philosophy. To the contrary, by relating all grounds to Dasein, Heidegger 
reexamines the concept of ultimate ground anew. 
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Before making all these conclusions clear, we must begin with a clarification of the 
problem itself. How is the problem of ground posed in traditional philosophy? And 
how does Heidegger posed anew the problem of ground by resorting to his Dasein 
analysis in early period? What is crucial difference between the two? 
1.1 The Problem of Ground in Traditional Philosophy 
Why this but not that? Why it happens in this way but not that way? Why are there 
beings at all rather than nothing? These are the questions that invoke scientific and 
philosophical investigation. Wonder, as the origin of philosophy, urges human beings 
to question themselves and the world they live in. To answer a why question means 
to give an account rather than stating a fact. It means to know its cause, its reason, to 
give a ground. 
The English term ground or germen term Grund bears abundant meanings. Ranging 
from "the bottom", "earth", "cause", to "reason" and "motivation", the meanings of 
ground are so diverse that may seem not definable at all.4 This situation also happens 
4 Clark.M. and Thyen O. ed. The Oxford-Duden German Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), P.367. 
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in the whole course of the history of philosophy. The meaning of ground can be 
traced back to ancient Greek's cosmology and ontology as arche (origin) and aition 
(cause). Later ground was used as ratio, causa, cause, reason, motivation, etc in 
medieval and modern philosophy. A systematic study of the diverse meanings of 
ground first appears in Schopenhauer's doctoral dissertation in 1813. Entitled as The 
fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, the paper analyzes the diverse 
meanings of ground through revisiting different possible formulations of the 
principle of sufficient reason in the history of philosophy. Ground can mean the 
cause of a becoming event, justification of a proposition, motivation of an act, and 
standard of measurement in time and space.^ These four conceptions capture most of 
the meanings of ground in ordinary as well as philosophical language. 
Although ground endows with different interpretations, the meaning of ground itself 
is often left behind. Ground is mainly used as an operative concept. Many 
philosophers employ the term for explaining their own system, but they seldom 
thematize it for inquiry. In fact, the above diverse interpretations of the meaning of 
5 In this paper, Schopenhauer's theme was actually the principle of sufficient reason but not the 
concept of ground or reason. There he listed four different formulations of the principle of sufficient 
reason which are irreducible to each other, they are: the principle of sufficient reason of knowing 
{principium rationis sufficientis cognoscendi), the principle of sufficient reason of becoming 
{principiiim rationis sufficientis fiendi), the principle of sufficient reason of acting {principium rationis 
sufficientis agendi), and finally the principle of sufficient reason of being {principium rationis 
sufficientis essendi). We just listed the four different meanings of ground that necessarily implied by 
these four different formulations 
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ground reflect, in different ages, philosophers having been seeking something as a 
foundation, a basis, a ground to explain. For them, the search for ground will 
necessarily lead to the search for an ultimate ground, a ground which grounds 
everything but itself is not grounded by anything else. Here, we will pick out three 
philosophers that exemplify the tendency of seeking an ultimate ground, which 
diverse in their approach and render three different types of ultimate ground, namely 
the metaphysical, epistemological, and theological ground. 
1.1.1 Metaphysical Ground: Aristotle and First Cause 
In Aristotle, even in the whole ancient Greek tradition, ground is often understood as 
aition. This Greek word is usually translated as "cause", and so Aristotle's famous 
doctrine is called the doctrine of four causes. Nevertheless, translating aition as cause 
may hinder our understanding. In contemporary English, the term "cause" normally 
refers to physical cause, which is understood in terms of cause and effect in natural 
events. This sense only captures what efficient cause means, but neglects the 
meaning of formal, material, and final causes. Aition, in ancient Greek, originally 
signifies the responsibility bear by someone or accusation of someone.6 In Aristotle, 
6 F.E.Peters, Greek Philosophical Terms: A Historical Lexicon (New York: N e w York University Press, 
1967)，p. 16 
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aition means what responsible for something being what it is. It has a much broader 
meaning than the term cause suggests. That is why different translations of aition are 
attempted to render it more accurate. For example, "explanation", "reason", and even 
"ground". These translations all bears advantages as well as disadvantages, and still 
need much discussion to choose a satisfactory candidate. ^For the sake of simplicity, 
we will follow traditional translation as cause, as long as we keep in mind those 
things mentioned. 
The relation between cause and knowledge is obvious in Aristotle. Following the 
ancient Greek traditional distinction between knowledge {episteme) and opinion 
(doxa), knowledge is defined by Aristotle essentially as knowledge about cause. If 
someone claims to know something, he should have grasped the "why" or the 
"cause" of that something. This determination of the essence of knowledge can be 
seen in Physics, Metaphysics, and Posterior Analytics. To quote one of a prominent 
passage from Physics as follows: 
Knowledge is the object of our inquiry, and men do not think they know a 
thing till they have grasped the 'why' of it (which is to grasp its primary 
7 For different suggested translations and their discussions, see Hanley, p.8-9. 
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cause). [Physics. 194b 17-19]^ 
The investigation of cause proceeds further by Aristotle's doctrine of four causes in 
Physics and Metapyhsics. He explains four different types of cause, namely formal 
cause (the form that makes something as what it is), material cause (the components 
that make up something), efficient cause (that which initiate the existence or 
becoming of something), and final cause (that which something for the sake of).^ 
With the four causes in view, in Book 1 of Metaphysics, he evaluates the success and 
failure of different theory of arche in many antecedent Greek philosophers. Until the 
four causes are fully articulated, the problem of arche can be said to be settled. 
Existence and becoming of things are being explained from different perspectives. 
Philosophy is also essentially an investigation of cause. “It is also right that 
philosophy should be called knowledge of truth. [...] we do not know a truth without 
its cause." [Metaphysics. 993b 20-21] Philosophy is an investigation out from 
wisdom, and as the supreme science among all, its subject matter should be 
distinctive. Metaphysics, as first philosophy, seeks not only cause of things, but the 
first cause. 
8 All Aristotle's texts come from The complete works of Aristotle translated by Jonathan Barnes. 
9 These terminologies of four causes are coined in scholastic philosophy in middle ages. Aristotle 
himself did not use any one of them. Rather he expressed the meaning of four causes in more 
complicated phrases. 
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[...]all men suppose what is called wisdom to deal with the first causes 
and the principles of things. This is why [...] the theoretical kinds of 
knowledge to be more of the nature of wisdom than the productive. 
[Metaphysics. 981b 26- 982a 1] 
What is the meaning of first cause? Why is a first cause necessary? Obviously, first 
cause is an ultimate cause that causes other things but itself not being caused. If there 
is a series of causes and consequences, first cause lies at the beginning of the series 
where it cannot be a consequence of something else. The necessity of positing a first 
cause is explained by Aristotle in Metaphysics Book 2. 
Evidently there is a first principle, and causes of things are neither an 
infinite series nor infinitely various in kind. [...] But of series which are 
infinite in this way, and of the infinite in general, all the parts down to 
that now present are alike intermediates; so that if there is no first there is 
no cause at all [Metaphysics. 994a 1-19] 
If there is not a cause as the first, then when we trace from a consequence to its cause, 
1 6 
infinite regress or ad infinitum will happen. For Aristotle, this is absurd. Furthermore, 
since cause is only intelligible in a series, if there is no first cause, the series of 
causes and consequence cannot be established, and thus, taken strictly, no cause is 
intelligible at all. This applies to all of four types of causes. For instance, in final 
cause, walking for the sake of health, this for the sake of happiness and it will not 
just go on forever without stopping somewhere. ^ ^ 
Metaphysics does not study any particular being, but beings as such or being qua 
being. If metaphysics is first philosophy, then the question being qua being will 
eventually link up with first cause. 
[...]if there is an immovable substance, the science of this must be prior 
and must be first philosophy, and universal in this way, because it is first. 
And it will belong to this to consider being qua being - both what it is 
and the attribute which belong to it qua being. [Metaphysics. 1026a 27-32] 
Being is said in manifold ways. Among the ten categories, only substance is in the 
strictest and fullest sense is, while other categories like quality or quantity are 
Aristotle has demonstrated the impossibility of each of four causes without a first cause in 
Meta.994a 1-25. 
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"being" analogically. But Aristotle further claims that the true nature of being is 
exhibited not in sensible substance, i.e. individuals in empirical world, but non-
sensible substance that is eternal and unchangeable. The substance that truly is is 
unmoved mover, namely God." Therefore, metaphysics leads to theology. 
God is cause of everything but itself not being caused. This is precisely the notion of 
unmoved mover. "That there are principles and causes which are generable and 
destructible without ever being in course of being generated or destroyed, is 
obvious." [Metaphysics. 1027a 29-30] Unmoved mover is the ultimate ground in 
Aristotle's metaphysics. It provides the final explanation for all existent things and 
event. But in Aristotle's passages, he never explicitly identifies God with a 
transcendent and personal God, like Christian God. The character of God for him is 
most appropriately only as a first cause. That is why this ultimate ground should be 
understood as a metaphysical ground. 
1.1.2 Epistemological Ground: Descartes and Archimedean Point of Knowledge 
If metaphysics is regarded as the first philosophy in ancient Greek, then the first 
‘‘There is debate on whether first philosophy is about beings as such (ontology) or particular being 
(theology). For example, W.D.Ross concisely mentioned this debate and provided his own solution. 
For details, see W.D.Ross, Aristotle (London & New York: Routledge, 1995)，p. 163. 
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philosophy in modern ages no doubt is epistemology. The success of natural science 
urges philosophers to reconsider whether traditional metaphysics is a legitimate 
knowledge or not. Prior to the question "what is out there" is the question "how do 
we know". Therefore, the main battlefield between empiricism and rationalism lies at 
the origin of ideas, which deal with the problem of the source of knowledge. 
Simultaneously, in general, the search for ground is primarily shifted from 
metaphysical to epistemological. Therefore, the concept of ultimate ground is 
imported with a new meaning concerning the theory of knowledge. 
Descartes is an appropriate philosopher to begin with. Not only because he is 
generally regarded as the father of modern philosophy, but also because in his 
Meditation on First Philosophy we can observe a clear and paradigmatic of the 
affirmation of epistemological ground. The task sets out in this book is to look for the 
ground of knowledge. Such ground is nothing but fundamentum absolutum 
inconcussum veritates, the absolute unshakable foundation of truth, without which all 
kinds of knowledge are impossible. 
I realized that it was necessary, once in the course of my life, to demolish 
everything completely and start again right from the foundations if I 
1 9 
wanted to establish anything at all in the sciences that was stable and 
likely to last. [Meditation on First Philosophy, p.12] 
In this task, contrary to scholastic philosophy in middle ages, any legitimacy of 
knowledge, even knowledge of God, is not accepted before the ground of genuine 
knowledge is demonstrated. As long as it is the ground of all knowledge, it should be 
something that its truth is beyond all possible doubt. Only then can other 
propositions in the knowledge system be derived from. 
The method employed in searching for such a ground of knowledge is universal 
doubt. Doubt is posed on all kinds of knowledge, so as to eliminate those possess 
chance to be false, even how little the chance is. Knowledge comes from sense, for 
instance our perception of empirical things, and knowledge comes from reason, for 
instance mathematical knowledge, are eliminated. Eventually, only the existence of a 
thinking I or ego that doubts is beyond all possible doubt. This I is not any extended 
thing or corporeal body, but a thinking thing, res cogitans}^ The popular version of 
this view is expressed in The Principle of Philosophy. 
12 One must not understand thinking as merely conceptual thinking. For various activities in mind 
such as desire, will, imagination are counted as thinking in Descartes. A thinking thing is actually a 
conscious thing. "A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, is willing, 
is unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory perceptions." [Meditation on First Philosophy, 18]. 
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So the knowledge that I think therefore I am is the first and most certain 
of all items of knowledge which anyone will arrive at if they 
philosophize in the right order. [The Principle of Philosophy, §7] 
The discovery of res cogitans or a thinking I completes Descartes' task. This ego of 
human being serves as the ultimate ground of all knowledge. 
Archimedes used to demand just one firm and immovable point in order 
to shift the entire earth; so I too can hope for great things if I manage to 
find just one thing, however slight, that is certain and unshakeable. 
[Meditation on First Philosophy, 16] 
Res cogitans is the Archimedean point not because it creates or causes all things in 
the world to exist. Rather, it is the Archimedean point of knowledge. It is an idea that 
clear and distinct which serves as the sole point of departure for all legitimate 
knowledge to derive from. Therefore, res cogitans is in this sense an ultimate ground 
of knowledge and thus epistemological. 
Though the existence of God is proved Meditation on First Philosophy and The 
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Principle of Philosophy, it is known only when the ground of knowledge is 
established, i.e. only after the demonstration of res cogitans. Two different order 
should be keep distinct here, namely order of cognition {prdine cognoscendi) and 
order of being (prdine essendi). In the latter order, God is prior to res cogitans since 
res cogitans does not create itself but rather as a product of God's creation. However, 
in the former order, res cogitans is prior to God since the knowledge of God is 
grounded in knowledge of res cogitans. If the existence of God is proved from the 
idea of God in a thinking I，then the existence of a thinking I must be shown certain 
first. And that is why the proof of existence of God is placed after the demonstration 
of res cogitans in Meditation of First Philosophy. Res cogitans is always 
epistemologically prior, and serves as the ultimate ground of all knowledge. 
1.1.3 Theological Ground: Leibniz and the God as the Sufficient Reason 
The relation between the concept of ground and Leibniz is obvious. The principle of 
sufficient reason in Leibniz is precisely the principle of ground. This principle states 
that nothing happens without a reason, or formulates positively, everything has its 
reason. It is not one principle among others, but a "great principle". [Monadology, §7] 
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Our reasoning are founded on two great principles, that of contradiction 
[...]And that of sufficient reason, in virtue of which we hold that no 
fact can be real or existent, no statement true, unless there be a 
sufficient reason why it is so and not otherwise, although most often 
these reasons cannot be known to us. [Monadology, §31-32]'^ 
Every event happens is possible to happen otherwise; everything exists is possible 
that has never existed at all. There must be a reason that makes the existence of these 
actualized event and things not otherwise. If one thing is the reason for another thing, 
then, according to the principle of sufficient reason, there must be something as a 
sufficient reason, which "has no need of any further reason - a "because" that 
doesn't throw up a further "why"? [The Principle of Nature and Grace, §8] 
Sufficient reason is Leibniz's conception of ultimate ground. Every explanation 
comes to an end when it has reached a sufficient reason. Hence, the principle of 
sufficient reason points to an account to the a fundamental question 
This principle (the principle of sufficient reason) laid down, the first 
question which should rightly be asked, will be, Why is there something 
All Leibniz's texts here come from Selections: Leibniz translated by P. Wiener. 
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rather than nothing? For nothing is simpler and easier than something. 
[The Principle of Nature and Grace, §7] 
Why are there beings rather than nothing? Why must there be anything at all? This 
question cannot be answered by pointing to any contingent being. As long as it is 
contingent, it could always otherwise and ask for its reason for not being otherwise. 
Therefore, for Leibniz, the sufficient reason for this question can never be sought in 
the series of contingent and empirical beings. God, and God alone, is the sufficient 
reason for the existence of all things. 
Thus it must be that a sufficient reason [...] or which is a necessary 
being, carrying the reason of its existence within itself; otherwise we 
should still not have a sufficient reason in which we could rest. And this 
final reason is called God." [The Principle of Nature and Grace, §8] 
Different from Aristotle's God as the unmoved mover, God in Leibniz's philosophy 
is obviously a personal God in Christian tradition. This can be seen, in Theodicy, 
when Leibniz males use of God as sufficient reason to deal with the problem of evil. 
The actual world we live in can be observed as having evil events, and we can 
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imagine a better world that contains less evil events. If God is omnipotent, 
omnibenevolent and omniscient, then it should have had created a better world rather 
than this actual world. However, if God is the sufficient reason for everything, then 
Leibniz must account of this fact. 
According to its essence, God always chooses the best, and the world it creates must 
be best among all possible choices. 
The best plan of universe, which God could not fail to choose, made it 
so. We judge from the event itself; since God has made it, it was not 
possible to do better. [Theodicy, Answer to VII Objection] 
Thus, the actual world containing evils could not be otherwise since it is already the 
best. Evils are in this way interpreted as a part of the best plan of God, and exist for a 
sufficient reason. Just like a certain proper dissonances will make a harmony 
beautiful. 
And the original limitation or imperfection of creatures requires that 
even the best plan of the universe could not receive more good, and 
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could not be exempt from certain evils, which, however, are to result in 
a greater good. [Theodicy, Answer to V Objection] 
God in Leibniz is a personal God who wills and chooses the best. Through God's 
choice, all beings come into existence for a sufficient reason, while God is a 
necessary being which does not need another reason for its existence. Here, God is 
conceived as the ultimate ground. In a way different from metaphysical and 
epistemological, it is a theological ground. 
Up to this point, it is clear that whether ultimate ground is pursued in a metaphysical 
ground, epistemological ground or theological sense, ultimate ground is understood 
from the point of view of being. Unmoved mover, res cogitans, or God is 
"something". Traditional way of addressing the problem of ground is positing a 
particular being as an ultimate ground for all other beings. In Heidegger's 
terminology, this ground remains ontic. 
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2 The Problem of Ground in Early Heidegger 
The problem of ground in traditional philosophy is a matter of searching for an 
ultimate ground. This ultimate ground is pursued in the sense of metaphysical, 
epistemological and theological. When it comes to Heidegger, the problem is revised 
radically. Instead of positing a particular being as ultimate ground, what Heidegger 
pursued is the ground of beings as such. Whether that being is unmoved mover, Res 
cogitans, personal God or not, as long as it is a being at all, it is grounded in Being. 
Being (Sein) is not any being {Seiendes) but is that which lets beings as what they are. 
In this sense, we may claim that only Being worths the name of ultimate ground. But 
identifying Being and ground will deviate from any traditional sense of ground. 
Being as ground is the topic received much discussion in later Heidegger but not 
fully pursued in early Heidegger. Instead, early Heidegger focuses on the problem of 
ground in relation to Dasein. If the problem of ground is in fact the problem of Being, 
then the sole pathway towards any problem of Being lies at a preparatory analysis of 
Dasein. This approach to the question of Being is set forth in Being and Time and 
prevails Heidegger's thought until his turning to his later philosophy since the 1930s. 
It is obvious that in early Heidegger Dasein analysis nearly dominated his philosophy 
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even though it is initially carried out only as a means towards the question of Being. 
Same case happens on the problem of ground. Though early Heidegger keeps 
insisting the intimate relation between Being and ground, what he put most of his 
effort on is the relation between ground and Dasein. As we shall see in the following 
sections, the problem of ground in early Heidegger is indeed formulated as the 
problem of transcendence of Dasein. Ground is discussed not from Being itself, but 
from Dasein's understanding-of-Being {Seinverstdndnis). 
1.2.1 The Question of Being and the Problem of Ground 
If one merely focuses on the elaboration of question of Being in Being and Time, 
then the relation between Being and ground may be too obscure to develop into any 
problematic at all. For Heidegger does not explicitly explain the question of Being in 
terms of ground, nor thematize the concept of ground for discussion. Before we 
move on to see how the problem of ground is formulated as the problem of 
transcendence, we should first make the relation between the question of Being and 
ground come to light. 
There are two possible formulations of the question of Being in early Heidegger, 
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First, the question of Being can be formulated as the question of the meaning of 
Being {Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein). This formulation appears in Being and Time, 
and it is usually regarded as the mature formulation in early Heidegger. Second, the 
question of Being can be formulated as the fundamental question of metaphysics 
(Grundfrage der Metaphysik). It appears at the end of What is Metaphysics? {Was ist 
Metaphysial) and at the opening of Introduction of Metaphysics {Einfuhrung in die 
Metaphysics). The former is a lecture presented in 1928 while the latter is a lecture 
course at the University of Freiburg in the summer semester of 1935. Despite they 
belong to different period of Heidegger's thought, the fundamental question of 
metaphysics recurs in both of them as a significant question'4. This is because it 
relates the question of Being to the concept of ground. 
The question of Being can be posed as "why are there beings at all rather than not 
nothing" {Warum ist iiberhaupt Seiendes und nicht vielmehr Nichts). In contrast to 
Leibniz, this question is not asked out from reason, but from fundamental 
attunements {Grundstimmungen). Only when Dasein situates in anxiety, profound 
boredom, or deep grief, can it genuinely pose this question. In Being and Time, this 
question does not appear. The question of Being is approached by a rather academic 
14 In the preface of the seventh German edition of Being and Time, Heidegger claimed that 
Introduction to Metaphysics can be viewed as an elucidation of the question of Being pursued in 
Being and Time. 
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manner there. But in What is Metaphysics? and more clearly in Introduction to 
Metaphysics, the question of Being is posed in a way aiming at awakening the reader 
to experience the force of it. It tries to put the reader into a genuine questioning 
rather than a murmuring of words that are of no concern.'^ Then, in what sense this 
question leads to the question of Being? Further, how does it stand with the concept 
of ground? 
Ordinary interpretation usually considers the second part of the question redundant. 
Hence, the question can be rendered in a shortened form as “why are there beings at 
all?" without losing its meaning. However, for Heidegger, the dismissal of “rather 
than not nothing" hinders a real insight. Nothing {Das Nichts), in the sense of no-
thing, lies beyond the realm of beings. It manifests in anxiety when the meaning of 
world as a whole becomes irrelevant to Dasein. The second part "rather than not 
nothing" completes the question by pressing the questioner to go beyond beings in 
general. 16 In this way, Being, which is not any being at all, is accessed by Dasein in 
this question. Therefore, Heidegger agrees with Hegel that Being and Nothing are the 
same. Since Being only manifests itself in Dasein when it holds out into nothing. 
15 A point to note: Introduction to metaphysics is not brief sketch of what is discussed in the discipline 
of metaphysics, like the introduction lesson in universities. But it should be a "leading into the asking 
of the fundamental question." and this in turn means a "leading-to must first awaken and create the 
questioning." [IM 21] 
16 In The Metaphysical Foundation of Logic, a different significance is emphasized in the phrase 
"rather than not nothing". Heidegger concentrates on "rather than", an expression pertains to the 
freedom of Dasein in relation to ground, instead of "nothing". 
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In the clear night of the nothing of anxiety the original openness of beings 
as such arises: that they are beings - and not nothing. But this "and not 
nothing" we add in our talk is not some kind of appended clarification. 
Rather, it makes possible in advance the manifestness of beings in general. 
[PM 83] 
Hence, the question "why are there beings at all rather than not nothing" pertains to 
the question of Being. It is recognized by Heidegger as the fundamental question of 
metaphysics. A fundamental question {Grundfrage) is a question asking about the 
ground {Grund)}'' When Dasein situates in anxiety, it is possible to ask "why are 
there beings at all rather than not nothing". Every why-question is a search for 
ground. Nevertheless, unlike traditional problem of ground, this why-question does 
not point to any particular being. Precisely in this question about ground beings are 
surpassed. It asks about the ground of beings. 
Only on the ground of wonder - the manifestation of the nothing 一 does 
the "why?" loom before us. Only because the "why" is possible as such 
17 This etymological linkage of Grundfrage to Grund is rendered obscure in English translation, 
although the term "fundamental" captures the meaning of ground to a certain extant. 
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can we in a definite way inquire into grounds and ground things. [...] and 
finally, we let the sweep of our suspense take its full course, so that it 
swings back into the fundamental question of metaphysics that the 
nothing itself compels: Why are there beings at all, and why not far rather 
Nothing. [PM 84] 
A clearer formulation appears in Introduction to Metaphysics: 
Why are there beings at all...? W h y t h a t is, what is the ground?[...] 
The question does not ask this or that about beings—what they are in each 
case, here and there, how they put together, how they can be changed, 
what they can be used for，and so on. The question seeks the ground for 
what is, insofar as it is in being {seined). To seek the ground: this means 
to get to the bottom {ergrunden). [IM 3] 
We have shown that the fundamental question of metaphysics is indeed the question 
of Being. And the question of Being in turn intimately relates to the concept of 
ground. Now we should take a further step to clarify the problem of ground in early 
Heidegger. 
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In early Heidegger, the problem of ground is formulated as the problem of the 
essence of ground {Wesen des Grundes). It is extensively discussed in On the 
Essence o f Ground and The Metaphysical Foundation of Logic. Essence here by no 
means refers to traditional conception of essence as essentia, which is the property 
that makes something what it is. Hence, although Heidegger recurrently explains the 
search for the essence of ground as a search for the meaning of ground as such, he 
does not attempt to find a universal definition of the concept. "The essence 'of 
ground cannot even be sought, let alone found, by asking after a universal genus that 
is supposed to result by way of an abstraction." [PM 132] What does Heidegger 
mean then? 
To this fundamental question of metaphysics Heidegger does not provide a direct 
answer. Rather, he draws our attention to the distinctiveness of the question. "Why 
are there beings at all rather than not nothing" questions beings in general. Even the 
questioner, who is also a being, is questioned. From "why are there beings at all 
rather than not nothing" necessarily springs forth in the questioner "why am I rather 
than not I". Why do Dasein ask why? Why do Dasein search for ground? A clear 
elaboration is seen in Introduction to Metaphysics: 
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The why-question challenges beings as whole, so to speak, outstrips them, 
though never completely. But this is precisely how the questioning gains 
its distinction. What is asked in this question rebounds upon the 
questioning itself, for the questioning challenges beings as a whole but 
does not after all wrest itself free from them. Why the why? [IM 5] 
In fact, the same idea has already emerged in The Metaphysical Foundation of Logic 
under the inquiry of the essence of ground. 
The inquiry into the essence of grounds can be put into formula which 
formulates the problem as Why do we ask, not just factically but 
essentially, qua Dasein, about the why? Why is there anything such as a 
why and a because? [MFL 213] 
The obscure expression "why the why" indicates an inquiry into the condition of 
possibility of why-question. As another face of the same coin, it also indicates an 
inquiry into the condition of possibility of ground. And this condition of possibility is 
sought in no elsewhere but Dasein. Therefore, the problem of ground in early 
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Heidegger can be reformulated in Kantian manner as "how is ground possible in 
Dasein." 
The interrogation of Dasein in the problem of ground is a unique approach adopted 
by early Heidegger, which is in parallel to his approach to the question of Being. If 
the question of Being is necessarily prepared by the analysis of Dasein, then similar 
case happens in his approach to the problem of ground. Why-question and its answer 
is something belongs to Dasein alone. No other being except Dasein is capable to 
raise such question and search for its answer. To lay bare the meaning of ground is 
first of all tantamount to laying bare its meaning in relation to Dasein. If the problem 
of ground implies the problem of Being, then, in early Heidegger, the problem of 
ground must be approached through the existential analysis of Dasein. 
1.3 The Task of Fundamental Ontology 
As we have just mentioned, the problem of ground intimately relates to the question 
of Being, and the question of Being is necessarily preceded by Dasein analysis, then 
the problem of ground must be unfolded in Dasein analysis. But why Dasein analysis 
is a point of departure? This can be clarified by revisiting the task of fundamental 
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ontology, the core of early Heidegger's thought. 
Ontology is a theory of being. Its etymological root comes from a combination of the 
Greek term on and logos. The former means beings while the latter primarily means 
discourse. Ontology makes discourse about beings. In the course of history of 
philosophy, ontology refers the any theory of beings. However, in Heidegger, 
fundamental ontology does not aim at providing another theory of beings but 
something precedes any theory of beings. 
For Heidegger, the real theme for ontology is not beings but Being. Ontology is a 
study guided by the question of Being. To develop any theory of beings, those beings 
must manifest as what they are to Dasein beforehand. Insofar as beings manifest as 
what they are, they must be founded on an understanding of their Being. As Being is 
that which makes beings as beings, therefore, it is fundamental since through a 
clarification of the meaning of Being the condition of possibility of any theory of 
beings (ontology in traditional sense) becomes clear. And precisely in this sense, 
fundamental ontology is regarded as "the basic grounding of ontology in general." 
[MFL 154] 
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Basically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a 
system of categories it has at its disposal, remains blind and perverted 
from its ownmost aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning 
of Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task. [SZ 11, 
BT31] 
But how should we obtain the meaning of Being? The question of Being is peculiar 
in its circular character. Being is not any beings, hence one cannot approach Being as 
if it is a being; at the same time, Being is not something absolutely isolated from 
beings since Being is always the Being of beings. When one makes Being as its 
theme, one cannot escape from interrogating beings. Therefore, a particular being 
must be chosen to serve as a path towards the problem of Being. Dasein does not 
stand like a stone with no concern of itself and its world. It is the sole being that 
cares its own Being. "Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other 
entites. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that 
Being is an issue for it."[SZ 12, BT 32] This implies that Dasein has understanding-
of-Being and thus capable of further developing a theory of Being or beings. By 
analyzing Dasein's horizon for its understanding-of-Being, we acquire the horizon 
for answering the question of Being. Thus, the task of fundamental ontology is 
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approached through an analysis of Dasein. 
Therefore, fundamental ontology, from which alone all other ontologies 
can take their rise, must be sought in the existential analytic of Dasein. 
[SZ 13，BT 34] 
The question of Being makes its detour through an investigation of Dasein's 
understanding-of-Being. In early Heidegger, the question of Being is a search for the 
meaning of Being. The usage of the term "meaning" (Sinn) implies that Being is first 
of all discussed relative to Dasein's understanding-of-Being. 
Then how does the problem of ground links to the task of fundamental ontology? If 
Being is the genuine ground of all beings, and Being must be investigated in relative 
to Dasein's understanding-of-Being, then the meaning of ground must then be sought 
in Dasein's understanding-of-Being too. A careful reading of On the Essence of 
Ground will discover that Heidegger does not identify Dasein with ground. Instead, 
the term grounding (grunden) is used to describe Dasein. This term，as a noun form 
of a verb, emphasizes Dasein's activities in relation to ground. Ground and 
grounding may seem parallel to Being and understanding-of-Being. Grounding may 
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suggest Dasein's activity of letting Being grounds beings and in this sense no 
different from understanding-of-Being but an interpretation with a focus on the 
concept of ground. Such grounding belongs to Dasein's existence which lets any 
beings to be encountered and taken as an ontic ground. Traditional conception of 
ultimate ground is bounded to be something ontic. But as long as it is a being, it must 
be grounded by Dasein's understanding-of-Being in order to manifest as what it is. 
Therefore, any traditional conception of ultimate ground is not ultimate for it lacks 
an account of understanding-of-Being. This grounding of Dasein is precisely the 
transcendence of Dasein. 
1.4 The Problem of Ground as the Problem of Transcendence 
Transcendence is a pivotal concept in Heidegger. Although the concept is only 
mentioned occasionally in Being and Time and the works before 1927, it is not 
exaggerated to claim Dasein analysis is tantamount to analysis of transcendence. 
That is why Heidegger does not hesitate to claim the task set forth in the published 
parts of Being and Time is nothing but "all serve the progressive elaboration of 
transcendence" [MFL 214-215]. In the years immediately after Being and Time, 
transcendence moved to the center of analysis, and it is frequently referred as 
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Dasein's basic feature in The Metaphysical Foundation of Logic, The Basic Problems 
of Phenomenology (1929) and On the Essence of Ground. For example: 
Transcendence in the terminological sense to be clarified and 
demonstrated means something that properly pertains to human Dasein, 
and does so not merely as one kind of comportment among other possible 
kinds that are undertaken from time to time. Rather, it belongs to human 
Dasein as the fundamental constitution of this being, one that occurs prior 
to all comportment. [PM 108] 
Although transcendence is newly introduced as a concise description of Dasein in 
those years after Being and Time, its meaning is familiar enough. It is simply because 
Heidegger equates transcendence, being-in-the-world and understanding-of-Being. 
The latter two concepts has already extensively discussed in Being and Time. 
If then primordial transcendence (being-in-the-world) makes possible the 
intentional and if the latter is, however, an ontic relation, and the relation 
to the ontic is grounded in the understanding-of-Being, then there must be 
an intrinsic relationship between primordial transcendence and 
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understanding-of-Being. They must in the end be one and the same. 
[MFL136] 
The concrete meaning of transcendence still needs further elaboration. We will take 
up this theme in a later chapter. For the moment, it is suffice to grasp how the 
problem of ground relates to the problem of transcendence. As we have shown, the 
problem of ground in early Heidegger can be formulated as a search for the 
condition of possibility of ground in Dasein. If any being is taken by Dasein as 
ground, then its Being must be understood by Dasein's understanding-of-Being. And 
if transcendence and understanding-of-Being are one and the same, then any ontic 
ground must be grounded in transcendence. That means only through unfolding the 
concept of transcendence can we obtain resources to determine the way how ontic 
ground has its possibility from Dasein's understanding-of-Being. In this sense, 
transcendence can be viewed as a more primordial grounding in which all ontic 
grounds arise. 
Therefore, transcendence can serve as the domain in which the problem of ground is 
to be encountered. Reciprocally, when transcendence is interpreted in relation to 
ground, its meaning is fully explicated as a primordial grounding of Dasein. 
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The exposition of the problem, however, is equivalent to attaining and 
designating the distinctive domain within which we may treat of the 
essence of ground without any claim to make visible that essence at a 
stroke. This domain is shown to be transcendence. This means at the 
same time that transcendence itself is first determined more originarily 
and more comprehensive via the problem of ground. [PM 99] 
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Chapter 2 
Dasein and World 
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If transcendence of Dasein equates to being-in-the-world, then it is necessary to 
clarify what Dasein and world mean beforehand. As we shall see, Dasein and world 
indeed intimately links together. By clarifying one of them in depth, another one will 
immediately come to light. An appropriate text to start with is definitely Being and 
Time. 
In Being and Time, its whole problematic is to lay bare time as the horizon of 
understanding-of-Being in Dasein. This is a necessary preparation before dealing 
with the question of Being. Thus, in early Heidegger, the question of Being is 
formulated as the question of meaning of Being {Sinn von Sein), which has already 
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shown that Being is spoken relative to Dasein's understanding-of-Being. In so far 
as the horizon of undertstanding-of-Being in Dasein is clarified, can we gain an 
appropriate horizon for investigating the meaning of Being. This preparatory analysis 
for answering the meaning of Being is denoted as existenial analytics of Dasein or, in 
a shortened form, Dasein Analysis. In such analysis, Dasein and world lie at the core. 
Analysis of world does not aim at explicating something "outside" Dasein, rather, the 
analysis of Dasein will eventually and necessarily lead to the analysis of world. The 
18 In Being and Time, a relevant text discussing Heidegger's concept of meaning can be found in 32: 
"Meaning is the "upon which" of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible as 
something [ . . . ] Meaning is an existentiale of Dasein, not a property attaching to entities, lying 
'behind' them, or floating somewhere as 'intermediate domain'." [SZ 153] Also in 65: "Taken strictly, 
'meaning' signifies the 'upon-which' of the primary projection of the understanding-of-Being." [SZ 
324] 
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two concepts belong together as a single phenomenon. 
2.1 The Concept of Dasein 
"Dasein" is Heidegger's terminology for human being. From the very beginning, 
Heidegger starts to realize the danger of admitting modern conceptions of human 
being as subject, I，consciousness, person, etc. These terms are thus avoided when 
talking about human beings. Initially, "factical life" (Faktische Leben), is a frequent 
term used by young Heidegger to refer to human beings, emphasizing its particular 
historical character. This can be seen, for example, in Ontology: The Hermeneutics of 
Facticity (1923) and Phenomenology of Religious Life (1920). Being more and more 
departed from life philosophy, later, in his opus magnum Being and Time, the term 
Dasein is fixed as terminology for human being. Ordinarily, Dasein in German 
signifies "there-to be" or "there-being". It means the presence of something, or the 
fact that something simply there. Thus it can be used on tables, stones, cats, dogs, 
and of course, human being. However, in Heidegger's terminologies, Dasein is 
employed with special meaning and restricted only to human being. Therefore, the 
concept of Dasein represents a mature thought about human being in early Heidegger. 
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2.1.1 Existence and In-each-case-mineness 
A convenient approach to Dasein is through the concept of existence. "The essence 
[Wesen] of Dasein lies in its existence." [SZ 42，BT 68] Dasein is the only being that 
exists. This decisive sentence that appears in Being and Time is misinterpreted by 
J.Sartre as the motto of existentialism, as Heidegger pointed out in a much later work 
Letter on Humanism (1946). This misinterpretation, which may be the one of most 
influential interpretations in history of philosophy, pertains to a problem not 
exclusively concerning Sartre but also those who seek to understand Heidegger. The 
crucial thing here is how we understand by the terms "essence" and "existence". 
Existence, or Existenz in German, usually refers to something simply is, something 
simply there, just like Dasein in ordinary German. In this way, to say a stone exists 
means a stone, having various properties, is really present here and now, rather than 
just illusion. Essence, in traditional philosophy, refers to property that makes 
something as what it is. The quest of philosophical anthropology is precisely the 
search for the essence of human being, i.e. human nature, the property that makes 
human being as human being. Its central problem "What is human being?" has been 
addressed by different philosophers from different perspective. Rational animal 
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{Zoon Logon Echon), image of God {imago dei\ social being, moral being, etc are 
prominent instances. They are formed by making one of the many properties of 
human being stands out, and call it human nature or humanitas. By resorting to that 
essence, they distinguish human being from all other beings. 
The above prevailing meanings of existence and essence actually come from the 
traditional schema of essentia and existentia in the medieval time. To investigate 
essentia is to investigate the what-ness of thing. This what-ness has to be a property 
possessed by the thing. For example, we may assert the essence of unicorn correctly, 
while there is no actual unicorn present. However, if there is a unicorn present, as 
long as it is a unicorn, then it must have such property as its essence. The actual 
presence of that unicorn is existentia. Claiming the essence of Dasein lies at its 
existence, Heidegger in no way attempts to develop another theory of philosophical 
anthropology. Indeed, he strives to distance himself from any attempt to define 
human being in its essence. 
The quest for essentia of human beings presupposes human beings as something 
being-present-at-hand (vorhandensein), being that is objectively present and 
possesses a group of properties. Thus Heidegger writes: 
[ . . . ] to determine the essence of 'man' as an entity, the question of his 
Being has remain forgotten, and that this Being is rather conceived as 
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something obvious or 'self-evident' in the sense of the Being-present-at-
hand of other created Things. [SZ 49, BT 74] 
A thing, such as stone, is defined by its what-ness, by its actual property. Dasein does 
not simply differ in property, but it has a different mode of Being from these things. 
Dasein does not equal to the totality of its actual property. It is not a bundle of static 
contents in presence. Rather, it understands itself in terms of possibility. Dasein can 
choose itself through relating to what it can be, its possibility. This is the basic 
meaning of existence in Being and Time. ^^  And that is why Heidegger always 
elaborates existence in terms of To-be (Zu-sein), Potentiality-for-Being (Sein-kdnnen), 
or ahead-of-itself. 
What "essence" means in Heidegger is more complicated and harder to grasp. I 
would employ a rather simple version. Essence here means nothing like essentia but 
d i s c l o s i n g . 2G To say essence of Dasein lies at its existence is to mean Dasein 
discloses itself, its world, and its Being in the process of existence. 
19 In Letter on Humanism, a much later work, existence is traced back to its Greek meaning as ek-
sistence, verbally means "standing-out". Dasein is the being standing out of itself as a being and 
"standing in the clearing of Being". [PM 244] 
2° For essence as disclosedness, see Cheung Chan-fai, Human Nature and Human Existence - On the 
Problem of Distinction Between Man and Animal. 
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In its existence, Dasein individuates itself. Every existence is a process belongs to 
that particular Dasein; every possibility is that particular Dasein's possibility. 
21 “Dasein has in-each-case-mineness {Jemeinigkeit), one must always use a personal 
pronoun when one addresses it: ‘I am', 'you are'." [SZ 42, BT 68] In-each-case-
mineness is the second characteristics of Dasein that comes immediately in view 
after the concept of existence. A paradigmatic instance for this characteristic is the 
phenomenon of death. Death is the ownmost possibility of Dasein which belongs to 
its Being from the day it borne. Facing one's own Death is thus always non-relational. 
This individuality is obvious from our daily word "I". "I" is a word that everybody 
could use to refer to himself, but reference of the word is different when the user is 
different. Only "I" could speak of "I". 
In-each-case-mineness indicates Dasein is always a self. Nevertheless, this is not to 
say Dasein, in its existence, excludes other things and other Dasein, and finally falls 
into a self-capsulate. It is quite absurd as a claim made by Heidegger. What he 
actually means by a self is less substantial. "Therefore I usually use the expression 
'selfhood' [Selbstheit] for metaphysical I-ness，for egocity. For the ‘self’ can be said 
21 For simplicity, I avoid introducing authenticity and inaurthenticity. The former as the mode of Being 
of Dasein as oneself, while the latter refers to that as Others. Inauthentic Dasein still understands itself 
in terms of possibility, however, these possibilities is not view as ownmost but as an indeterminate 
someone, which is called the They (Das Man). This is not to say Dasein loses it character of in-each-
case-mineness, but rather a special mode of it. That is why in the state of inauthenticity, Dasein exists 
as a they-self. It is still a self, only understood with the They and its ownmost possibility is concealed 
rather than cancelled. 
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equally to the I and the thous: ‘I-myself，，'you-yourself', but not 'thou-I'." [MFL 
188] Self does not primarily refer to an ego or I which is in contrast to other egos. It 
expresses rather a kind of relation. Other beings have to be related to Dasein in some 
way or other so as to manifest themselves to it. They are beings for this particular 
Dasein. Therefore, for instance, I am not my uncle, but as long as my uncle is another 
Dasein accessible to me; it has to be "my" uncle. Instead of making Dasein 
separately from other beings absolutely, in-each-case-mineness renders any access to 
other beings possible. 
Existence and in-each-case-mineness are introduced in the beginning of Dasein 
analysis. They both serve as effective guiding threads for unfolding the concept of 
Dasein. As we shall see, these two characters remain crucial as the analysis proceeds. 
A significant consequence right after introducing existence and in-each-case-
mineness is a fixation of horizon that we must keep in view. If Dasein cannot be 
understood as something present-at-hand, then traditional categories, which only can 
be used to describe things, will fail to grasp Dasein. Therefore, a new set of language 
is designed to describe human being. Any Dasein's understanding of itself in its 
concrete existence is called "existentiell" (existenziell). However, in its concrete 
existence, Dasein has not yet grasped his structure of existence thematically. And the 
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articulation of such structure of existence is called "existentiale" (existenzial). 
Instead of addressing Dasein in its “whatness”，this new set of language expresses its 
"how-ness" of existence. The aim of Dasein analysis is to work out various 
existentials, characterizing Dasein in depth. 
2.1.2 Care 
Unlike stone or plants, Dasein is the being that cares for itself, its surrounding, its 
own Being. Therefore, Heidegger characterizes Dasein's Being as care (Sorge). 
Nevertheless, one must not equate care to certain psychological state, which possess 
by someone contingently. Instead of belonging to ontic phenomenon, care is 
existential-ontological. In §4 of Being and Time, Dasein is characterized as follows: 
Dasein is a being which does not just occur among other beings. Rather it 
is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is 
an issue for it. [SZ 12，BT 32] 
Similar expression, or even exact repetition, echoes in different contexts throughout 
Being and Time. "It is an issue" is the translation of German ''es geht um”, which 
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means something is a concern for somebody. Heidegger's coinage for umgang 
(dealing), umwelt (surrounding world), umsicht (circumspection) and so forth are 
based one the prefix um, which etymologically links to that expression. This implies 
that all these concepts have to be understood in terms of Dasein's Being as care. 
Therefore, in §41 of Being and Time, care is explicitly considered as the structural 
whole of all different existentiales: 
The formally existential totality of Dasein's ontological structural whole 
must therefore be grasped in the following structure: the Being of Dasein 
means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being alongside 
(beings encountered within-the-world). This Being fulfills in the 
signification of the term "care", which is used in a purely ontologico-
existential manner. [SZ 192, BT 237] 
This clumsy elaboration can be divided into three parts: first, ahead-of-itself 
indicates that Dasein exists its possibilities and chooses itself rather than confined as 
what it is now and what it was; second, already-in-the-world shows Dasein always 
finds itself already exists in a certain situation that it does not create. Dasein is 
thrown into that situation contingently. Any attempt to give a reason for why Dasein 
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exists in such situation would probably be futile. Finally, Being alongside means 
Dasein always relates itself concemfully to surrounding things and other Daseins. 
The three parts represent the themes of existence, throwness, and dealings in the 
world respectively. They form an equiprimordial unity. That is to say all existentiales 
are mutually interdependent, none of them is considered more primary from which 
other existentiales are derived. Every existentiale has to be understood in terms of 
care. And any concrete property that Dasein possesses is made possible only as a 
consequence of care. In general, care means nothing but Dasein, in its world, exists 
its finite possibilities and deals with things and other Dasein. 
To characterize Dasein fundamentally as care means nothing like a selfish Dasein. 
Dasein does not primarily "care" for its welfare, and bases the "care" for others on 
the benefit of its own. Rather, any behavior or attitude towards other Dasein is 
possible insofar as that Dasein manifests in my world. This happens only when the 
other Dasein does matter to that particular Dasein. To sacrifice for someone beloved 
presupposes that someone is already in a relation that matters to Dasein. "If one were 
to construct the expression 'care for oneself [Selbstsorge], following the analogy of 
concern [Besorgen] and 'solicitue' [Fiirsorge], this would be tautology." [SZ 193，BT 
237] It is only through care {Sorgo), that care for things (concern) and other Dasein 
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(solicitude) first become possible. 
Further, it may seem Heidegger intends to rank the practical over the theoretical. To 
a certain extent this is true, but it overlooks a deeper significance. It is correct to 
claim practical attitude is more primordial than theoretical attitude with regard to 
Dasein's dealings in everyday life. But what concerns Heidegger most is not whether 
the practical is prior to theoretical or not. 
When we ascertain something present-at-hand by merely beholding it, 
this activity has the character of care just as much as does a "political 
action" or taking a rest and enjoying oneself. "Theory" and "practice" are 
possibilities of Being for an entity whose Being must be defined as "care". 
[SZ 193，BT 237] 
Whether it is a theoretical or practical activity, it must be founded on Dasein as 
different modification of care, rather than consciousness or subject. Hence, it is 
correct for Dreyfus to point out it is too superficial in interpreting Dasein merely as a 
doing subject in contrast to knowing. 
22 H.Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger 's Being and Time, Division 1. 9''' ed. 
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2001), pp.48-49. 
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2.1.3 Understanding-of-Being 
Dasein is the being, in its own Being, that its Being is an issue for it. This implies 
that Dasein has already understood its own Being. To render such understanding 
possible Dasein should have already understood the meaning of Being in general also. 
Thus, care points to a crucial phenomenon that the whole Dasein analysis is trying to 
work out: 
But in that case, this is a constitutive state of Dasein's Being, and this 
implies that Dasein, in its Being, has a relationship towards that Being 
- a relationship which itself is one of Being. [...] Understanding-of-
Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein 's Being. Dasein is 
ontically distinctive in that it is ontological. [SZ 12, BT 32] 
Heidegger employs a special meaning for "understanding". Understanding here 
means nothing like conceptual thinking, for example, Kant's understanding {Verstand) 
with twelve pure categories. To say Dasein always has understanding-of-Being does 
not imply that it has a conceptual grasp of the meaning of Being already. Rather, 
understanding-of-Being is always a vague understanding. 
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Being is projected upon something from which it becomes understandable, 
but in an unobjective way. It is understood as yet pre-conceptually, 
without a logos; we therefore call it the pre-ontological understanding-of-
Being. [BP 281] 
This vague understanding can be further confirmed by a linguistic fact. The use of 
the word "is" is a simple linguistic phenomenon. In question like "what is...", "who 
is...." Or assertion like "this is ”，"there is...." we are acquainted with "is", 
though we may not be able to define it conceptually. "We do not even know the 
horizon in terms of which that meaning is to be grasped and fixed. But this vague 
understanding of Being is still a Fact." [SZ 5, BT 24] It is this vague, but certain, 
understanding-of-Being that we should attend to. 
Understanding-of-Being is thus not one of many activities of Dasein but a 
fundamental happening. Heidegger indeed equates existence and understanding-of-
Being. From such vague understanding-of-Being, it is possible for Dasein to further 
develop into conceptual articulations of what has already been understood. However, 
it is not the case that only if we have developed an ontology then do we have an 
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understanding-of-Being. Hence, it is understanding-of-Being grounds ontology but 
not ontology grounds understanding-of-Being. Therefore, understanding-of-Being is 
a phenomenon in no need to be proved but clarified. 
2.2 The Concept of World 
When Heidegger unfolds the structure of care, the concept of world plays an 
important role. Actually, care has already spelled out most of the meaning of being-
in-the-world, another basic description of Dasein that Heidegger frequently uses. 
Being-in-the-world is obviously formulated against any conception of man as subject 
and consciousness. Dasein is not primarily an isolated subject, from which its world 
is derived later. Rather, as long as Dasein exists, it is existing in a world that is 
already given. But what does world means? "The derivative form 'worldly' (weltish) 
will then apply terminology to a kind of Being which belongs to Dasein, never to a 
kind which belongs to entities present-at-hand ‘in’ the world." [SZ 65, BT 93] 
Coinage of the word "worldly", an adverb describing an activity, has already shown 
that world should be understood primordially in relation to Dasein's existence: 
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World refers to a "how" of Being of beings, rather than to these beings 
themselves [...] This prior "how" as a whole is itself relative to 
human Dasein. The world thus belongs to precisely to human Dasein, 
even though it embraces in its whole all beings, including Dasein. 
[PM 112] 
The concept of world is ordinarily interpreted as the totality of beings. Heidegger 
claims that such kind of ordinary conception of world is not false, but it is only 
derivative. The primordial phenomenon of world refers to the referential whole of 
meaning or a horizon of meaning. Dorm Welton even points out that the discovery of 
world as horizon is an important shared view in phenomenology, despite of the many 
disagreements among phenomenologists.^^ This phenomenon of world is seen only if 
we investigate it as worldlihood (weltlichkeit), that is world as an existentiale of 
Dasein.24 
D.Welton, World in Encyclopedia of Phenomenology. Ed. Lester Embre (Dordrecht; Boston : 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), p.736. 
24 Weltlichkeit is a difficult term to translate. It is a noun derived from an adverb weltlich. 
Macquarrie's translation as "worldhood" omits this etymological linkage simply renders it as world-
hood. This may mislead people to think the discussion of Weltlichkeit is to determine the essentia of 
world. Just like Zeitlichkeit has to be understood in relation to Dasein's existence, Weltlichkeit must be 
also understood as Dasein's existentiale. Therefore, here I propose a more clumsy but precise 
translation as "worldlihood", with its etymological linkage to the term "worldly". 
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2.2.1 Analysis of Tools 
How can we get access to the primordial phenomenon of world? One of the 
approaches is by analysis of tools (Zeug)?^ Primordially, beings are encountered by 
Dasein as something useful in everyday life. This may sounds trivial but precisely in 
this trivial fact Heidegger finds a path towards the primordial phenomenon of world. 
Our understanding of tools in everyday life is not yet theoretical or conceptual grasp 
of objects. Beings do not first being taken as objects and rely on a subject's 
constitution before becoming a tool for Dasein. Things (as tools) that manifest in the 
mode of Being called readiness-to-hand {Zuhandenheit). In everyday life, Dasein 
uses tools for various purposes unreflectively, provided that beings, before becoming 
any object for a subject, are already manifested to Dasein as something useful. 
Dasein unreflectively gets a vague understanding to ready-to-hand things only in 
practical dealing with tools. No wonder Heidegger associates this kind of 
understanding with a practical know-how. ^^  This implies that tools are always 
already there for Dasein priori to any objectification of them. Thus, this kind of 
25 Three possible approaches: analysis of tools, analysis of fundamental attunement (Gnmdstimmung), 
and conceptual history of "world". The first approach is found in Being and Time most prominently; 
the second is found in Being and Time (analysis of Angst), The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics-, 
while the third is found in The Metaphysical Foundation of Logic, and On the Essence of Ground. 
26 "In German we say that someone can vorstehen something—literally, stand in front of or ahead of it, 
that is stand as its head, administer, manage, preside over it. This is equivalent to saying that he 
versteht sich darauf, understands in the sense of being skilled or expert at it [has the know-how of it]" 
[BP390-392] 
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beings is said to be "manifests itself in its own right" in contrast to objects which is 
represented by subject. "The kind of Being which tools possess—in which it 
manifests itself in its own right~~we called ‘readiness-to-hand"'. [SZ 69，BT 98] 
The meaning of a tool is not self-sufficient. Rather, each tool has already referred to 
something beyond itself. "Tools — in accordance with its tool-hood - always is in 
terms of [aus] its belonging to other tools [...]" [SZ 68, BT 96] As something useful, 
they share the structure of "in-order-to" (um-zu). Tools are always used to complete 
certain tasks or achieve certain goals. Pen for writing, water for drinking, phones for 
calling, etc. In turn, these tasks or goals can also serve as means to further ends. 
What underlies each tool is a nexus of relations as its source of meaning. This 
referential whole is what Heidegger denotes as world. Therefore, world in its 
primordial sense signifies nothing about particular being or beings as whole, but only 
the relational context between beings. Heidegger writes: 
World as a wholeness "is" not a being, but that from out of which Dasein 
gives itself the signification of whatever beings it is able to comport itself 
toward in whatever way. [PM 121] 
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2.2.2 World as referential whole 
This referential whole is composed of references (Verweisungen). These references 
can be basically classified into three types: first, the reference between the tool and 
its task, and the task to be achieved is called the toward-which (das Wozu); second, 
the reference between the tool and other Dasein that involved, that Dasein is called 
the for-which (das Wofiir); third, the reference between the tool and Dasein (tool 
user)'s possibility, the latter is called for-the-sake-of-which {Worum-willen). These 
three kinds of references form a nexus with for-the-sake-of-which as the central 
point. For-the-sake-of-which is not merely one of the references among other but a 
primary one. "The primary 'towards-which' is a ‘for-the-sake-of-which，. But the 
'for-the-sake-of always pertains to the Being of Dasein, for which, in its Being, that 
very Being is essentially an issue." [SZ 84, BT 115] If a pen is for writing (towards-
which), and it is written for someone (for-which), then it is meaningful as long as it 
is done for Dasein's possibility (for-the-sake-of-which). Therefore, the meaning of 
beings in the world is organized primarily in relation to that particular Dasein's 
possibility. 
If tools are far from being any object, then world as a referential whole, in which 
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they acquire their meaning, could not be conceive at object level too. To say Dasein 
has an understanding of world is not to say Dasein has a conceptual knowledge of a 
totality of objects. Similar to the case of tools, world as referential whole is that 
which already there, "something" that is already given to Dasein. In undisturbed 
usage of tools, the context in which the tools manifest must be understood by Dasein 
equiprimordially. World is "something" that already there in Dasein's everyday life 
or rendered by Heidegger as apriori. 
The apriori character of world hints a further meaning of reference as involvement 
{Bewandtnis). Donn Welton writes: "[...] involvement {Bewandtnis) [...] is not as a 
cognized agent who is related to things, but as an engaged agent who is involved 
with them and who finds what he or she is in what he or she does."^^ Making contrast 
between "involved with" and "relating to" as practical relation and theoretical 
relation is helpful but without getting to the bottom. Involvements among beings are 
indeed presupposed in Dasein's practical dealing with tools. However, "involved 
with" is distinctive from "related to" since the latter is posited under subject-object 
schema while the former is not. 
27 D.Welton, World in Encyclopedia of Phenomenology. Ed. Lester Embre (Dordrecht; Boston : 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997)，p.739. 
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To speak of a subject relates to an object means the meaning of object is given by the 
subject. Their relationship is established by the subject. If world as referential whole 
is conceived with this picture, then we have to conclude that world is nothing but a 
consequence of subject. Therefore, Welton points out afterwards precisely "relating 
to" presupposes subject-object schema, the distinction between inner and outer, 
passive and active, it is "inadequate to cover the reciprocal determination and 
circulation" of references in the world. Heidegger does not attribute the meaning of 
reference to any side of beings in this relationship. 
Dreyfus writes, "the involvement whole and Dasein's life are both organized by the 
same for-sake-of-whichs. It helps to distinguish something like an 'objective' and a 
‘subjective’ side of this phenomenon only to see that in the end they cannot be 
distinguished.，，28 Dasein and its world are equiprimordial. World, as primarily 
constituted by for-the-sake-of-which, is disclosed only in Dasein's existence. At the 
same time, the possibilities that Dasein exists are given by the world that it already 
dwells. Dasein can choose its possibilities only insofar as these possibilities are given 
in the world beforehand. 
28 H.Dreyfus, Being-in-the- World: A Commentary on Heidegger 's Being and Time, Division 1. 9"�ed. 
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2001)，p.98. 
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What Heidegger admits is the relationship itself as given. Involvement in every case 
refers to letting beings to stand in the reference which is already there. That is why 
involvement makes us turn to Dasein 's character as openness for beings, as 
disclosedness. World in each case is not a product of human subjectivity. Rather, it is 
that which we, as particular Dasein, given ourselves to. Only in such given 
referential whole, can Dasein acquire the meaning of itself and other beings. 
If world is taken primordially as a referential whole, then the idea of "objective 
world" is immediately revised. According to ordinary conception of world as a 
totality of beings, all human beings exist in the same world. However, although 
world as a referential whole is an existentiale common to different Dasein, its 
concrete content varies from Dasein to Dasein. Considered from perspective of 
ordinary conception of world, an American and a Chinese certainly lives in the same 
objective world. But considered in the primordial sense of world, they live in a 
different world since they stand in different context of meanings. 
2.3 Being-in-the-world and Dasein as Disclosedness 
Dasein as Being-in-the-world does not refer to something which locates in a physical 
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space called "world". "Being-in" does not describe relationship like "water is in a 
glass" or ‘‘a boy is in a classroom". "The talk of being-in-the-world is not an 
observation concerning the factical appearing of Dasein; it is not an ontic statement 
at all." [PM 110] Being-in-the-world is Dasein's way of Being. It is an ontological-
existential statement. If being-in does not signify any physical location, but dwelling 
and familiarity.29 Being-in-the-world means that Dasein, as a being that cares about it 
own Being, always dwells in a world (referential whole). Then, what does this 
dwelling actually mean? 
From the analysis of care, we can see that being alongside the world indicates an 
important character of Dasein. In its Being, Dasein constantly deals concemfully 
with other things and other Daseins. Dasein is essentially being alongside the world 
not because it is surrounded by things in a physical space side by side. Being-
alongside has to be understood as Dasein's openness for beings. 
In our everyday dealings with beings implies that these beings are encountered by 
Dasein, and this in turn implies Dasein itself should have the structure that allows 
these beings to be encountered. W.Biemel thus points out that all these dealings 
29 In Being and Time, Heidegger draws our attention to the fact that Being-in indeed etymologically 
relates to the notion of dwelling and familiarity. For details see SZ 54/ BT 80. 
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which are appropriate to Dasein alone "presupposes an openness, a being open 
for... or receptive to.. .{Offensein fur)'' Dasein can understand his relation to pen 
and thus use it for writing, but this is not the case that the pen understands its user in 
order to provide its function. Beings other than Dasein can only be encountered, but 
not letting something be encountered (Begegnenlassen). Openness of Dasein is priori 
to any concrete working, changing, producing on beings. This letting something be 
ecountered by Dasein is the character of openness. 
It is true for Biemel to claim that openness is a profound meaning of existence. This 
is more primary than the previous meaning existence as understanding oneself in 
terms of possibility. He writes: "If we want to think the concept of Dasein, we must 
try to think this happening opening, of giving openness. [...] With it we attain a new 
or deeper concept of existence. Existence now means placing oneself into the realm 
of openness. Ex-sistence is thus setting entities forth into the unhiddenness {Sich-
aussetzen in die Entborgenheit des Seienden). In this region entities can be 
encountered by Dasein."^ ^  
Although Biemel resorts to the texts mainly after 1929 (including Introduction to 
3° Walter Biemel, "Heidegger's Concept of Dasein" in Heidegger 's Existential Analytics, ed. Frederic 
Elliston (The Hagur: Mouton, 1978), p. 122. 
31 Ibid, p. 123 
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Philosophy and On the Essence of Truth), similar meaning of Dasein as openness 
have already discussed in Being and Time. 
Dasein is the being that "the Being which is an issue for this entity in its very Being 
is to be its 'there'. [SZ 133，BT 171] Here, we come to a decisive interpretation of 
why the word Dasein is chosen. Da-sein always exist in its Da, its "there". If the 
"there" of Dasein signifies nothing like a physical location, then what does it mean? 
Heidegger writes: 
'Here' and 'yonder' are possible only in a ' t he r e ' t ha t is to say, only 
if there is a being which has made a disclosure of spatiality as the 
Being of the 'there' [...] In the expression 'there' we have in view this 
essential disclosedness. [SZ 133，BT 171] 
The 'there' of Dasein means the realm of disclosedness in which beings are able to 
manifest themselves. "Dasein is its disclosedness." [SZ 133, BT 171] Insofar Dasein 
exists, it always discloses the entities in its world. M. King provides a concise 
interpretation: "Only, this thereness has to be thought in Heidegger's sense as an 
event which brings the illumination of Being into the world-all, and does so because 
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it is a disclosing way of being. [...] the word Dasein maybe unfold in the following 
way. [...] man's factical existence discloses (his being-there) discloses thereness."^^ 
One of the meaning of the there of Dasein is its world. For any beings to be able to 
manifest to Dasein, it must manifest in the world that priori disclosed. 
Dasein, as being-in-the-world, is always open to other beings. This conception shows 
precisely how Dasein differs from a subject or consciousness. A subject, like 
Descartes' s res cogitans, is first of all isolated from other beings. Various capacities 
can be attributed to this subject, however, its status as an isolated self remains 
unchanged. This subject exists first of all, and relates to other beings afterwards. 
However, Dasein does not exist first and then obtains its world later. To exist means 
to exist in a world. Dasein and other beings belong together in a world. Therefore, 
the traditional epistemological problem, namely how a subject goes beyond its inner 
realm to an object outside, is vanished in Heidegger. Before subject-object distinction, 
Dasein is related to other beings. Before obtaining any knowledge about the world, it 
has already gone beyond itself outside to the world. "And furthermore, the 
perceiving of what is known is not a process of returning with one's booty to the 
'cabinet' of consciousness after on has gone out and grasped it; even in perceiving, 
32 Magda King, A Guide to Heidegger 's Being and Time. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
2001), P.48. 
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retaining and preserving, the Dasein which knows remains outside, and it does so as 
Dasein." [SZ 62, BT 62] 
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Chapter 3 
Transcendence, Truth and Ground 
7 0 
In the previous chapter, we have shown that Dasein is not an isolated subject, but a 
being necessarily exists in a world. That means in existence of everyday life, Dasein 
has already dwelled in certain relations with things and other Daseins. Transcendence 
is that which makes this possible. K.Held summaries, "in the original movement of 
transcendence toward the world, Dasein strips away from the self-enclosed, obscure 
realm of beings that very bright dimension of the appearing, of the world horizon, in 
whose light alone beings can manifest themselves.，，33 In transcendence, Dasein strips 
out from an isolated realm and access to a world in which various beings manifest. In 
order to understand the meaning of Dasein as being-in-the-world in depth, we have 
to grasp transcendence in its full clarity. 
The word "transcendence" comes from the Latin transcendere. Transcendere can be 
further traced back into its components trans, which means beyond or over, and 
ascandere, which means to climb.34 Taken together, transcendere means to step over, 
to cross over, to surpass. Everyday usage of transcendere usually refers to a spatial 
crossing over from one place to another. Being derived from its literal meaning, 
transcendence is no longer restricted to mere spatial relationship in philosophy. 
33 Klaus Held, "Heidegger and the Principle of Phenomenology" in C.Macann ed. Martin Heidegger -
Critical Assessments Vol. II. p. 313. 
34 D.A.Kidd. Latin Dictionary Plus Grammer (Glasgow: Harper Collins Publisher, 1997), p. 19 and 
221. 
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In medieval scholastic philosophy, transcendence is discussed in relation to ens 
transcendens, which refers to the infinite and unconditioned being that traditional 
Aristotelian categories cannot capture, for example God. Later in modem philosophy, 
Kant introduces new meanings to the concept of transcendence in his critical 
philosophy. In Critique of Pure Reason {Kritik der Reinen Vernuff), under the task of 
demarcation of the boundary of knowledge, Kant distinguishes two conceptions of 
transcendence. First, transcendental refers to character of human cognitive power 
which is the apriori condition of possibility for any experience. The inquiry into 
transcendental structure of human power, for instance forms of intuition belonging to 
sensibility and pure categories belonging to understanding, marks an influential step 
of Kant's whole project of critical philosophy, namely the Copernican Revolution in 
philosophy. In contrast distinction to transcendental, transcendent refers to the 
character of things that completely lies beyond the realm of experience, or rendered 
concisely as thing-in-itself {Ding an sich). It is different from transcendental since it 
does not relate to experience in any way. Something transcendent, as concluded by 
Kant, is only conceptually possible but lacks real reference. ^ ^ This constitutes Kant's 
35 For the distinction between transcendent and transcendental, Kant writes: "We will call the 
principles whose application stays wholly and completely within the limits of possible experience 
immanent, but those that would fly beyond these boundaries transcendent principles. But by the latter 
[ . . . ] I mean principles that actually incite us to tear down all those boundary posts and to lay claim to 
a wholly new territory that recognizes no demarcations anywhere. Hence transcendental and 
transcendent are not the same." Immanuel Kant, translated by Paul Guyer, Critique of Pure Reason 
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critique of a main trend in modern philosophy which claims human beings can have 
knowledge about things that are completely independent of themselves. 
In Heidegger, the concept of transcendence is posed neither under any theology nor 
epistemology. Rather, transcendence should be understood as a basic feature of 
Dasein and belongs to the project of fundamental ontology. It refers to the character 
of Dasein that is prior to any theoretical activities but in turn makes them possible. 
Transcendence pertains to the phenomenon that Dasein always exists in a world and 
relates to other beings. But such determination of transcendence may bring us to a 
confusion between two concepts: intentionality and transcendence. The former refers 
to Husserl's core concept in his phenomenology, while the latter indeed shows how 
Heidegger is different from Husserl. This difference is emphasized by Heidegger 
again and again. Hence, it is worthwhile to have a look. By doing so we shall grasp 
the meaning of transcendence in Heidegger more fully. 
2ed. (Cambridge: The Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.384-385. 
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3.1 Intentionality and Transcendence 
"Transcendence, being-in the-world, is never to be equated and identified with 
intentionality; if one does so, as often happens, one proves only that he is far from 
understanding this phenomenon and that the latter cannot be grasped immediately." 
[MFL 168] Transcendence is not intentionality. This statement always echoes in 
Heidegger, however, as he anticipated, confusion "often happens". ^^  How does this 
confusion arise? And how does transcendence in Heidegger differ from intentionality? 
Intentionality is regarded as one of the most important discoveries of phenomenology. 
Husserl, the father of phenomenology, makes intentionality as the genuine theme for 
philosophical investigation. Although the concept of intentionality owes its meaning 
to medieval tradition and Brentano, it is Husserl who first considers it as a core 
concept in philosophy. If we are to clarify what intentionality means in 
36 Merleau-Ponty, for example, explains Heidegger's transcendence in terms of "operative 
intentionality" {fugierende intentionlitat), which has already emerged in later Husserl in the concept of 
life-world (Lebemwelt). In Phenomenology of Perception, he writes: "In Husserl's language, beneath 
the "intentionality of the act", which is the thetic consciousness of an object, and which, in intellectual 
memory for example, converts "this" in an idea, we must recognize an "operative" intentionality 
which makes the former possible, and which is what Heidegger terms transcendence." 
[Phenomenology of Perception, 346] Operative intentionality refers to unthematized intentionality that 
consciousness has already possessed in everyday life. Merleau-Ponty thus claims that the meaning of 
transcendence is not originated from Heidegger. 
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phenomenology, we have to go back to Husserl. 
3.1.1 The Concept of Intentionalitv in Husserl 
In Husserl, intentionality is regarded as the essential structure of consciousness. In 
other words, every consciousness is nothing except intentional experience. What is 
intentional experience? In Logical Investigations (LI), the first work breaks through 
to phenomenology, Husserl writes: 
Intentional experiences have the pecularity of directing themselves in 
varying fashion to presented objects, but they do so in an intentional 
sense. [...] This means no more than that certain experiences are present, 
intentional in character and, more specificially, presentatively, judgely, 
desirely or otherwise intentional. [LI Vol.11, 558] 
Every consciousness is consciousness of something. In perceiving, something 
perceived; in imagination, something is imagined; in desiring, something is desired. 
In the act of consciousness, an object is intended. This object is not confined to be an 
object of theoretical knowing, but object in a broad sense as something that 
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consciousness refers to in different sorts of activities. 
The concept of intentionality focuses on the manner of givenness of an object to 
consciousness. It refers to a "how" rather than a "what" of consciousness. For 
example, in a perception of a box, what concerns us is not whether a box or an 
orange is perceived, but rather the essential way of any perceived object given to 
consciousness. 
Intentionality does not presuppose the real existence of object. The object as 
something intended by consciousness is evident if there is consciousness at all. 
If this experience {intentional experience) is present, then, eo ipso and 
through its own essence (we must insist), the intentional 'relation' to an 
object is achieved, and an object is 'intentionally present' [...] The object 
is 'meant', i.e. to 'mean' it is an experience, but it is then merely 
entertained in thought, and is nothing in reality. [LU Vol II, 558] 
For instance, imagination of unicorn concerns an object that does not really exist, but 
unicorn as an intended object does affect the consciousness in this imaginative act. 
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As Zahavi points out, "Thus, an important aspect of intentionality is exactly its 
existence-independency. It is never the existence of the intentional object that makes 
the act, be it a perception or hallucination, intentional." Intentionality does not 
concern whether objects really exist independent of consciousness or not, but rather 
how the meaning of object is given to consciousness. That is why this object of 
intentionality is simply an intentional object. 
The intentional object for consciousness is easily misunderstood as a mere 
representation of a real object in external world. Under traditional subject-object 
schema, subject and object are conceived in terms of inner realm and outer realm. 
Object, as something exists independent of subject, is something lies external of 
subject. If any object is to be known by the subject, then it must somehow enter the 
inner realm of subject. Then problem arises from whether the subject can really 
access to the outer world through its inner ideas or representations. This problem of 
external world have been haunting different philosophers (even contemporary ones) 
since Descartes. However, intentional object is simply something intended in 
consciousness. Consciousness is never something exists like a cabinet, and objects 
are never things put into consciousness afterwards. Intentional object is "there" for 
Dan Zahavi, Husserl's Phenomenology (Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press, 2003), p.21. 
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consciousness and affects it without presupposing any distinction between inner 
representation and external real object. 
Therefore, by the concept of intentionality we obtain a dual significance: On one 
hand, all objects are objects of consciousness. Their meanings must be relative to the 
intentional acts of consciousness. On the other hand, consciousness is always 
consciousness of object. There is no intentional act without an object. This shields 
light on the mutual relationship between subject and object. 
In Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenology Philosophy. 
First Book {Ideas I), Husserl turns from a descriptive and anti-metaphysical 
phenomenology, which is developed in Logical Investigation, to a transcendental 
phenomenology. Intentionality is then based on an account of transcendental 
consciousness. This part of Husserl's phenomenology is often an object of criticisms 
by his precedents, like Heidegger. 
Transcendental consciousness is a subject in a genuine sense. Such consciousness is 
transcendental or pure since it is in contrast to any empirical consciousness that can 
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be taken as an object for investigation in any positive science.^^ It gives meaning to 
any object while it can never belong to the world of objects. Therefore, subjectivity is 
always prior to objects.^^ This difference between transcendental consciousness and 
object renders two distinct regions for investigation. If to inquire the essential 
structure of such consciousness is to inquire intentionality, then it is clear that the 
world of objects is not abandoned but only taken anew as a theme for 
phenomenology. Objects are not investigated as something exist independent of 
consciousness, but as intentional objects whose meanings are necessarily grounded in 
transcendental consciousness. 
To the cogito itself belongs an immanent "glancing towards" the object, a 
directedness which from another side springs forth from the "Ego", which 
can therefore never absent. [Ideas /, 121] 
38 Indeed, the term transcendental is used in contrast to natural attitude. Thus transcendental 
consciousness is the consciousness that accessible to us after our suspension of natural attitude 
through phenomenological epocfie. 
39 In section 49 of Ideas 1, a controversy section, Husserl even asserted that we can imagine a 
worldless subject but not a world without subject. 
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3.1.2 The Transcendent and the Immanent in a Phenomenological Sense 
With intentionality grounded in transcendental consciousness, Husserl discusses his 
own sense of transcendence. The transcendent is not something that entirely lies 
beyond the world of experience, like thing-in-itself in Kant, but something belongs to 
the object realm for transcendental consciousness. Hence Husserl often uses the 
phrase "transcendent object" in Ideas I. As transcendence is attributed to objects, and 
the manner of givenness of object must be grounded in transcendental consciousness, 
then precisely on the ground of transcendental consciousness any type of 
transcendence is possible. 
The meaning of transcendence can be illustrated with an example of perception of a 
physical thing. In the perception of a box, we can only perceive it from one 
perspective. As we walk around the box, we perceive it from another perspective 
although the box remains the same object. Consciousness can grasp the box from 
different perspectives, but box in its totality can never be perceived by consciousness. 
From this trivial example, Husserl arrives at the conclusion that physical thing can 
only be given to consciousness perspectively. This incomplete manner of givenness 
is peculiar to perception of something transcendent. 
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Of necessity a physical thing can be given only "one-sidedly"; and that 
signifies, not just incompletely or imperfectly in some sense or other, but 
precisely what presentation by adumbrations prescribes. [...] To be 
infinitum imperfect in this manner is part of the unanullable essence of 
the essence of the correlation between "physical thing" and perception of 
a physical thing. [Ideas 1, 94] 
However, in the case of perception of any conscious states of oneself, it is not limited 
in this way. We do not perceive our feeling, for example, one-sidedly. Rather, it is 
given absolutely. This character belongs essentially to perception of something 
immanent, which is in contrast to perception of something transcendent. 
Nevertheless, transcendent objects are transcendent only for a subject. They are not 
transcendent in itself but grounded in transcendental consciousness. 
It can already be seen universally that no matter what its genus may be, 
the being of something transcendent, understood as a being for an Ego, 
can become given only in a manner analogous to that in which a physical 
thing is given, therefore through appearance. [Ideas 1, 95] 
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As we have mentioned before, we perceive a box only perspectively. A box perceived 
in this face may look different from the other side, but we still regard the box 
perceived as a single object. Then one requires consciousness to synthesize these 
different perceived contents to form a single object. "The sort of consciousness 
concerns uniting consciousness with consciousness can be characterized as synthesis, 
a mode of combination exclusively peculiar to consciousness." [Cartesian 
Meditation, 39] In this sense, transcendental consciousness is the condition of 
possibility of any transcendent object. This position is then often known as 
transcendental idealism, emphasizing the transcendental priority of subjectivity. 
The concept of transcendence in Husserl is indeed explained on the basis of 
intentionality. And intentionality is nothing but the essential structure of 
consciousness. This decisive move is precisely what makes Heidegger distances 
himself from Husserl's intentionality. 
3.1.2 Ontic and Originary Transcendence 
Heidegger does not reject the concept of intentionality as a whole. Instead, in History 
of the Concept of Time, he appreciates intentionality as one of the three discoveries of 
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phenomenology. Heidegger agrees that intentionality describes an important 
characteristic of human beings. What should be put into question is not the concept 
of intentionality itself, but the explanation of intentionality. "It is not intentionality as 
such that is metaphysically dogmatic but what is built under its structure [...]" [HCT 
47] For Husserl, intentionality is explained in terms of consciousness. However, in 
Heidegger, any exposition of intentionality will leave the realm of consciousness but 
grounds at Dasein. 
Intentionality in Husserl is primarily intentionality of representation, although 
representation here is not defined as reflection of real objects in external world. 
Intentionality involves psychic content and requires synthesis in consciousness. Only 
on top of this act of consciousness, the object can then be view as an object for 
various utilities. Though Husserl maintains there are different kinds of intentionality, 
all of them are grounded at representation of consciousness. That is why Heidegger 
comments intentionality in Husserl is at bottom a thinking, theoretical knowing. To 
interpret intentionality as something belongs to consciousness results from the 
traditional priority of theory over practice, knowing over doing. And that is why the 
phenomenology of Husserl is still an epistemology, a study concerning how object is 
known by a subject: 
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Thus every act of directing oneself towards something receives the 
characteristic of knowing, for example, in Husserl, who describes the 
basic structure of all intentional relating as noesis [thinking]; thus all 
intentionality is first a cognitive intending, upon which other modes of 
active relation to beings are later built. [MFL 134] 
However, Heidegger has already shown that our everyday dealings with beings do 
not presuppose representation. We can see from our previous analysis of tools, in our 
undisturbed usage of things, these beings do not become objects for consciousness. 
Someone wearing shoes comfortably does not aware of his shoes and think of them. 
At the same time, he does not show complete ignorance about the shoes. As long as 
he is able to use it for walking, he knows something about the shoes, though in an 
implicit manner that involves no representation of consciousness. Heidegger calls 
this state in our everyday dealing with beings absorption {Aufgehen). Intentionality 
of representation contains the error of subjectivizing intentionality. Heidegger writes: 
The usual conception of intentionality [...] misconstrues the structure of 
the self-directedness-towards, the intention. This misinterpretation lies in 
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an erroneous subjectivizing of intentionality. An ego or subject is 
supposed, to whose so-called sphere intentional experiences are then 
supposed to belong. [...] The idea of a subject which has intentional 
experiences merely inside its own sphere [...] [BP 63-64] 
To overcome intentionality as representation of consciousness, one has to avoid 
attributing intentionality to consciousness or subject. Intentionality as such, even 
intentionality of representation, has to be understood from Dasein's everyday relation 
to beings. 
Intentionality is indeed related to the beings themselves and, in this sense, 
is an ontic transcending comportment, but it does not primordially 
constitute this relating-to but is founded in a being-by beings [MFL 134] 
If every intentional act of consciousness necessarily relates to an intentional object, 
certain beings must be given beforehand for Dasein in everyday life. Only when 
everyday dealings with beings are disturbed, Dasein thematizes beings as objects for 
a self-awared subject. This is the way how representation and consciousness 
originate in Dasein. Intentionality of representation is not fundamental but derived 
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from a more primordial mode of Dasein's relation to beings. In other words, every 
thematized object must come from unthematized relation to beings. Before a subject 
relates to an object, Dasein has already existed with other beings. Therefore, unlike 
Husserl, beings do not need something like subjectivity's constitution in order to be. 
Instead, prior to the split of subject-object, beings are already there for Dasein in 
everyday life.4° 
If knowing is to be possible as a way of determining the nature of the 
present-at-hand by observing it, then there must first be a deficiency in 
our having-to-do with the world concemfully. [...] When Dasein directs 
itself towards something and grasps it, it does not somehow first get out 
of an inner sphere in which it has been proximally encapsulated, but its 
primary kind of Being is such that it is always "outside" alongside 
entities which it encounters and which belong to a world already 
discovered. [SZ 61, BT 88-89] 
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This unthematized relation to beings is called comportment (verhalten). It is used as a term for 
intentionality without representation, and marks a peculiar way that Dasein exists in everyday life. 
"Comportments have the structure of directing-oneself-toward, of being-directed-toward. Annexing a 
term from Scholasticism, phenomenology calls this structure intentionality." [BP 58] 
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To understand intentionality from the existence of Dasein implies a further 
investigation on transcendence, a peculiar feature of Dasein which makes 
intentionality possible at all. 
If one characterizes all comportment toward beings as intentional, then 
intentionality is possible only on the grounds of transcendence. 
Intentionality, however, is neither identical with transcendence, nor, 
conversely, does it itself make transcendence possible. [PM 106] 
The problem of intentionality and the problem of transcendence belong to two 
different domains. It is only through transcendence does intentionality possible at all, 
regardless of intentionality concerns theoretical or practical activities "The problem 
of transcendence as such is not at all identical with the problem of intentionality. As 
ontic transcendence, the latter is itself only possible on the basis of original 
transcendence, on the basis of being-in-the-world." [MFL 135] 
Heidegger differentiates two conceptions of transcendence. Ontic transcendence 
concerns transcendence from one being to another. Theological transcendence 
concerns transcendence from finite being to infinite being; epistemological 
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transcendence concerns transcendence from subject to object. Even intentionality, 
whether it involves representation or not, concerns transcendence from Dasein to 
other beings. Regardless of their difference in content, all these kinds of 
transcendence concerns relations between beings. Nevertheless, any manifestation of 
beings is possible only on understanding of Being, and Being is not any beings at all. 
Therefore, underlies every ontic transcendence is originary transcendence, which 
transcends beings as such. Heidegger claims this transcendence points to the genuine 
problem of transcendence. 
What truly transcendent is neither thing-in-itself nor object for consciousness, but 
Dasein. 
The Dasein is the transcendent being. Objects and things are never 
transcendent. [BP 300] 
Thus, through the critique of Husserl's intentionality, Heidegger's task is two-folded. 
First, proceeds beyond intentionality of representation and goes back to Dasein's 
comportment to beings in everyday life. Second, proceeds beyond ontic 
transcendence (be it intentionality or comportment of Dasein towards beings) to 
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originary transcendence. The second task is considered as more fundamental and thus 
posited as the problem of transcendence in Heidegger. Whenever Heidegger uses the 
term transcendence in his own way, he rather refers to originary transcendence. Thus, 
transcendence cannot be posed as the problem of intentionality, which is ontic at 
bottom. This is a crucial point but easily being overlooked. 
In a certain sense, Heidegger does not go against the concept of intentionality. His 
existential analysis of Dasein can be viewed as a deepened development of 
intentionality as such. It is only through transcendence and comportment of Dasein 
can we first fully understand intentionality: 
The task of bringing to light Dasein's existential makeup leads first of all 
to the twofold task, intrinsically one, of interpreting more radically the 
phenomena of intentionality and transcendence. With this task~of 
bringing to view, along with the more originary conception of 
intentionality and transcendence, a basic determination of Dasein's whole 
existence一we also run up against a central problem that has remained 
unknown to all previous philosophy. [BP 162] 
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3.2 Transcendence of Dasein 
Now, we can see that the problem of transcendence is not identical to the problem of 
intentionality. Transcendence in an original sense refers to the character of Dasein. 
However, this character of Dasein was not initially taken up in his extensive analysis 
of Dasein in Being and Time. Indeed, there transcendence is rendered as 
transcendence of the world. In the writings after Being and Time, transcendence is 
rendered more often as transcendence of Dasein. The two different expressions 
finally points to one phenomenon. In what sense world is the transcendent? And how 
does it imply Dasein is transcendent? 
3.2.1 The Problem of Transcendence: Transcendence of World and Transcendence of 
Dasein 
In Being and Time, although the problem of transcendence is not a main theme of 
Dasein analysis, it is explicitly discussed under the problem of temporality 
{Zeitlichkeif) of Dasein. The part two of Being and Time is indeed a reinterpretation 
of part one in the light of temporality of Dasein. Many existentiales of Dasein listed 
in part 1 are taken up for discussion again, and finally aims to show how temporality 
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of Dasein made them possible. In §69，when Heidegger approaches the temporality of 
being-in-the-world, the problem of transcendence is posed as the problem of 
transcendence of world. What is the problem about then? 
In the previous chapter, we have shown that world is primordially a referential whole 
in which beings manifest themselves. In this sense, world is not any beings and does 
not belong to ontic level. In his later writings, Heidegger explains it more clearly that 
world is no-thing. "In fact the world is nothing - if "nothing" means: not a being in 
the sense of something extant; also "nothing" in the sense no-thing, not one of the 
beings Dasein itself as such transcends; but Dasein transcends itself as well." [MFL 
195] However world is not nihil negativum, but nihil originarium. It is not in a 
absolute sense nothing, but a nothing that generates meaning. Though world is not 
any beings at all, as a referential whole letting beings manifest, it must be in some 
way "there". Hence problem arises for how such a world accessible to Dasein? 
[ . . . ] in what way is anything like a world possible at all? In what 
sense is the world? What does the world transcend, and how does it 
do so? How are independent beings within-the-world 'connected 
with the transcending world? [SZ 351, BT 402-403] 
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To inquire the problem of transcendence of world is to inquire the possibility of 
world as referential whole. How does the possibility of world connect with 
transcendence? What is indeed transcended or surpassed? Obviously, world must 
transcends beings in general in order to be a world at all. World is the transcendent 
since it belongs to the realm of Being of Dasein by surpassing beings. Subsequently, 
Heidegger proceeds to show how world as the transcendent is made possible by the 
estatic character of temporality, the horizon for understanding-of-Being. The problem 
of temporality is too complex that we shall not pursue further here. 
In the works emerged immediately after Being and Time, transcendence was more 
frequently rendered as transcendence of Dasein rather than transcendence of world. 
The concept of transcendence moves to the core of explication of Dasein. If world is 
that which surpasses beings in general, then Dasein, as being-in-the-world, must be 
capable of accessing to that which beyond the level of beings. That is why 
transcendence of world implies transcendence of Dasein. Indeed they can be viewed 
as two aspects of one and the same phenomenon: 
The world [...] is truly transcendent, which is still further beyond 
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than objects, and at the same time this beyond is, as an existent, a 
basic determination of being-in-the-world, of the Dasein. If the 
world is the transcendent, then what is truly transcendent is the 
Dasein. [BP 424] 
Transcendence is a character peculiar to Dasein. Literally, transcendence composes 
of three aspects: First, that which accomplishes the surpassing; second, towards 
which the surpassing points; third, that which is surpassed. According to this 
structure, we obtain a systematic exposition of transcendence of Dasein by 
Heidegger. Dasein is the being that accomplishes the surpassing. World is that which 
Dasein surpasses towards. "We name world that toward which Dasein as such 
transcends, and shall now determine transcendence as being-in-the-world." [PM 109] 
And beings as such is that being surpassed. "What is surpassed is precisely and 
solely beings themselves, indeed every being that can be or become unconcealed for 
Dasein, thus including precisely that being as which "it itself exists." [PM 108] 
Therefore, transcendence of Dasein means that Dasein surpasses from beings as such 
towards world in its existence. If world is not any beings at all, then transcendence 
towards world means transcending towards no-thing. Thus, in What is Metaphysics, 
Heidegger also writes: "Holding itself out into the nothing, Dasein is in each case 
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already beyond beings a whole. Such being beyond beings we call transcendence.” 
[PM 91] And this is precisely what being-in-the-world means. 
3.2.2 Transcendence as Projection of World 
Transcendence means projection of world in such a way that those beings 
that are surpassed also already pervade and attune that which projects. 
[PM 128] 
The above quotation is one of the few concise definitions of transcendence. 
Transcendence as the surpassing towards world is further explained in terms of 
projection {Entwurf). Projection is the peculiar character of Dasein which determines 
the meaning of surpassing. Hence, we should first clarify what it means in order to 
unfold the meaning of transcendence. 
The concept of projection has already emerged in Being and Time when Heidegger 
discusses the existential concept understanding (Verstehen). "Why does the 
understanding [...] always press forward into possibilities? It is because the 
understanding has in itself the existential structure which we call 'projection'." [SZ 
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145, BT 184-185] The relation between understanding and projection persists in 
works like The Basic Problem of Phenomenology. 
To understand means, more precisely, to project oneself upon a possibility, 
in this projection to keep oneself at all times in a possibility. A can-be, a 
possibility as possibility, is there only in projection, in projecting oneself 
upon that can-be. [BP 277] 
Here, understanding does not refer to intellectual activity of consciousness, which 
belongs to one among different capacities of human beings, but rather a fundamental 
character of the existence of Dasein. "To exist is essentially, even if not only, to 
understand." [BP 276] Therefore, Heidegger sometimes claims this understanding as 
existential understanding, which is nothing but Dasein's projection of possibility. 
Projection means nothing like designing a clear plan beforehand. Rather, it is used 
according to its basic meaning in German as "throwing something away from 
oneself. Dasein, its existence, throws forward to possibility. Hence, projection can 
be explained from two components. First, that which projection projects towards is 
possibility. Possibility is ordinarily defined as something not yet and has nothing to 
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do with present state of Dasein. This definition covers a genuine relationship 
between possibility and Dasein. Dasein always relates itself to what it can be rather 
than confined in what it is and what it was. Possibility has already emerged and 
affects Dasein in its existence. The possibility unveiled as what Dasein can be is 
"for-the-sake-of-which". It is not any indifferent possibility that will merely happen 
in future, but as a possibility that concerns Dasein's Being. Second, that which being 
projected is Dasein itself. Possibility as what Dasein can be should not be understood 
as ideas or representation in consciousness, but rather as imthematized constituent of 
Dasein's existence. For instance, when Dasein is wearing its shoes for walking, it 
involves no representation of the possibility of Dasein that the shoes is used for, but 
the possibility of Dasein does constitute the meaning of the beings as shoes for that 
particular Dasein. In this sense, Dasein and its possibility do not split into two 
different things, like a subject and its object; instead, they fused into one. “[...] the 
projection is the way I am the possibility" [BP 277] ‘‘[".] in each case Dasein is its 
possibility" [SZ 43, BT 68] 
World is constituted by various references, namely the towards-which, the for-which, 
and the for-the-sake-of-which. For-the-sake-of-which is the primary reference that 
all other references must relate to. It gains its distinctiveness since it is precisely 
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Dasein's own possibility that Dasein always keeps projecting to. World as a 
referential whole is understood by Dasein only if Dasein projects itself to its for-the-
sake-of-which. At the same time, for-the-sake-of-which is never isolated from other 
references but always manifests together. As long as Dasein understands itself, it has 
to understand itself in a world. Hence, whenever Dasein projects itself, it projects a 
world. Self-understanding and world-understanding are equiprimordial. 
World-understanding as Dasein-understanding is self-understanding. Self 
and world belong together in the single entity, the Dasein. [BP 297] 
That is why Dasein is said to be world-forming {Weltbilden). Though Dasein's 
projection towards the possibility that is an issue of it, things and other Dasein then 
become something that matters to it in the world. Furthermore, by choosing its "for-
the-sake-of-which", Dasein modifies its relation to other things and other Dasein in 
the world at the same time. Thus, Heidegger said "in choosing itself Dasein really 
chooses precisely its Being-with others and precisely its Being among beings of a 
different character." [MFL 244-246] If Dasein's relations to beings in its world are 
modified, then it is no difference to say the referential whole is modified. Dasein 
chooses its world as it chooses itself. In other words, Dasein's projection of world is 
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precisely projection of itself. Dasein's ability to constitute its world brings us to a 
core meaning in the phenomenon of world. Therefore, world must not be understood 
as a static and fixed context, but primarily dynamic whole that Dasein participates in 
forming. Therefore, transcendence of Dasein is identical to projection of world, and 
in turn also identical to world-forming. 
If Dasein's self-projection points forward to the realm of possibility, then its world-
projection will turn out to be also pointing to the same realm. World is a referential 
whole that composed of various possibilities. The task of writing a letter (towards-
which) and a letter for someone (for-which) is the possibility of a pen, and their 
meaning are relative to the writer's possibility (for-the-sake-of-which). Indeed, world 
as a referential whole of possibilities presupposes Dasein's projection of possibility. 
"World exists—that is, it is~~only if Dasein exists, only if there is Dasein." [BP 297] 
Consequently, we have reached a deeper meaning of transcendence. Transcendence 
as projection of world means transcending from actuality to possibility. And 
precisely world becomes a possibility whole through transcendence of Dasein, it 
surpasses all beings as something actual. "World, as the totality of the essential 
intrinsic possibility of Dasein as transcending, surpasses all actual beings." [MFL 
192] This will bring us back to one of the most significant sentence in Being and 
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Time: "Higher than actuality stands possibility." [SZ 38，BT 63] 
Transcendence as projection of world is simultaneously confined and attuned by 
beings that Dasein exists with. Though projection of Dasein is essentially projecting 
towards possibility, it is far from Dasein can project to any possibility arbitrarily. The 
possibility to which Dasein projects is not logical possibility, but finite possibility 
given to Dasein by the world that it already in: 
Possibility, as an existentiale, does not signify a free-floating potentiality-
for-Being in the sense of the 'liberty of indifference' {libertas 
indifferentiae). In every case Dasein, as essentially having a 
Befindlichkeit’ has already got itself into definite possibilities. [SZ 144， 
BT 183] 
In contrast to logical possibility, Heidegger usually uses "thrown possibility" to refer 
to the kind of possibility that is peculiar to Dasein. This possibility is thrown in the 
sense that it is already given to Dasein. Dasein can only choose itself within the 
finite possibilities that is given by its own situation and history which Dasein is 
incapable of choosing. Throwness is not something like a fact that happened once 
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and ended after all. As long as Dasein is what it is now and deals with things, then it 
remains in the throw and being limited. Thus, projection is also essentially "thrown 
projection". In summary, transcendence means Dasein's projection towards finite 
possibilities and lets the world manifests. 
3.2.3 World-entry 
If transcendence of Dasein means projection of world by surpassing from actuality to 
possibility, and a world thereby manifests itself to Dasein, then it should be 
intimately linked to what Heidegger call world-entry (Weltemgang). 
As being-in-the-world, transcending Dasein, in each case, factically 
provides beings with the opportunities for world-entry, and this 
provision on the part of Dasein consists in nothing other than in 
transcending. [MFL 195] 
Transcendence lets beings enter into a world. To speak of "enter into" a world here is 
in fact metaphorical. Heidegger always insists that “enter into" is not any physical 
movement like a boy enters into a room. "When and how is this possibility realized? 
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Entry into world is not a process of extant things, in the sense that beings undergo a 
change thereby and through this change break into the world. [...] World entry has 
the characteristic of happening, of history (Geschichte). World-entry happens when 
transcendence happens, i.e. when historical Dasein exists. [MFL 194] World-entry is 
not an event that happens after a being is "there", rather it happens with a being when 
it first manifests as what it is. In other words, beings manifest themselves only when 
they entered into a world. 
Beings, such as nature in the broadest sense, could in no way 
become manifest unless they found occasion to enter into a world. 
This is why we speak of their possible and occasional entry into 
world. [PM 123] 
Beings are able to manifest themselves only when they somehow relate to a world. 
Not only beings like stone, pen and other Dasein can only be encountered by Dasein 
in a world, even Dasein itself, which considered as one being among others in this 
case, must understand itself in a world. This is possible as long as a world has 
already been established and disclosed. If it is only in transcendence of Dasein a 
world firstly being disclosed, then transcendence can be said to be providing 
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occasions for beings to enter into a world. Only on top of this can beings be 
understood in terms of possibility and thus able to be encountered by Dasein as tools. 
Beings that have already entered a world are called beings-within-the-world in Being 
and Time. If objects or beings present-at-hand is derived from disturbance of tools in 
everyday life, then they are possible insofar as they are primordially something that 
has entered a world. Therefore, beings only manifest themselves when a world is 
related to them beforehand. 
This bringing world before itself is the originary projection of the 
possibilities of Dasein, insofar as, in the midst of beings, it is to be 
able to comport itself towards such beings. Yet just as it does not 
explicitly grasp that which has been projected, this projection of 
world also always casts the projected world over beings. This prior 
casting-over [Uberwurf\ first makes it possible for beings as such to 
manifest themselves. [PM 123] 
The concept of world-entry brings us again to a recurrent theme in Heidegger. 
Manifestation of beings as what they are presupposes the participation of Dasein. 
"And only if this primordial history, namely, transcendence, occurs, i.e., only if 
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beings having the character of being-in-the-world irrupt into beings, is there the 
possibility of beings manifesting themselves." [PM 123] If there is no Dasein, no 
being-in-the-world, no transcendence, then, at the same time, no being manifests as 
what it is, regardless whether there is something there independent of Dasein. For 
these independent beings cannot be spoken, manipulated, understood by Dasein if 
there is no world-entry happens on them. 
4.3 Transcendence and Truth 
When Heidegger approaches transcendence in relation to the problem of ground, the 
concept of truth is often interrogated. "Yet if the essence of ground has intrinsic 
relation to the essence of truth, then the problem of ground too can be housed only 
where the essence of truth draws its inner possibility, namely, in the essence of 
transcendence." [PM 106] At first sight, the relation between transcendence and truth 
may look obscure. Why truth requires transcendence? In what sense is transcendence 
is truth's "inner possibility"? 
If transcendence concerns the manifestation of beings in Dasein, then it is obviously 
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related to unconcealment of beings and Being. "Transcending is an uncovering. The 
Dasein exists as uncovering." [BP 70] Unconcealment is precisely what truth means 
in Heidegger. In order to understand the intimate relation between transcendence and 
truth, we must first of all alter our ordinary conception of truth. 
4.3.1 Ontic and Ontological Truth 
In traditional philosophy, truth is conceived as something belongs to judgment or 
proposition, and a true proposition is defined as correspondence between judgment 
and the object judged. Heidegger summarizes this ordinary conception of truth as 
follows: 
An assertion is harmonious, i.e. is correct, when the relation of 
representations agrees with that about which the judgment is made. The 
harmony (the identitas of the nexus) draws it correctness and validity 
from the correspondence of what is thought in judgmental thinking with 
that about which judgment is made, the object of judgment. [...] From 
ancient times this correspondence is characteristic of truth. [MFL 124] 
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Heidegger insists that the traditional conception of truth as adaequatio, the 
correspondence between judgment and object, is derivative. Any conception of truth 
as adaequatio itself gives no account of how something ideal (meaning of 
proposition) and something real (the object) can be compared and thus said to be 
correspondent to each other. Such account, for Heidegger, can only be given if we 
have an insight into a primordial kind of truth, which provides the basis for 
prepositional truth. This primordial kind of truth has to be sought in the realm of 
beings rather than in propositions. 
Prepositional truth is rooted in a more originary truth (unconcealment), in 
the pre-predicative manifestation of beings, which maybe called ontic 
truth. [...] Unveiledness of Being first makes possible the manifestation 
of beings. This unveiledness, as the truth concerning being, is terms 
ontological truth. [PM 103-104] 
The name of truth in ancient Greek was aletheia. Literally, lethe refers to 
concealment, hiddenness, coveredness. The prefix a has a privation function. Hence, 
aletheia means the removal of concealment and thus let things be seen as they are. 
The English translation unconcealment, imhiddenness, or uncoveredness renders the 
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original meaning of aletheia to a great extent. This old meaning of truth is what 
Heidegger retrieved as the primordial meaning of truth. What being unconcealed are 
beings {Seiendes) and Being of beings {Sein des Seiendes). Heidegger called the 
former ontic truth, and the latter ontological truth. Although beings and their Being 
always manifest together, ontological truth is in a sense more primary since Being is 
the condition of possibility of any manifestation of beings. Truth can be attributed to 
both beings-within-the-world and Dasein, but with different mode of truth. 
In keeping with the different kinds and domains of beings, the character 
of their possible manifestness and of the accompanying ways of 
intepretively determining them changes. Thus, for example, the truth of 
what is present at hand (for example, material beings) as discoveredness 
is specially distinct from the truth of those beings that we ourselves are, 
from the disclosedness of existing Dasein. [PM 103] 
Being-true is tantamount to being-uncovering, which signifies Dasein's way of Being. 
Beings other than Dasein only manifest themselves in so far as they are uncovered by 
Dasein. Thus, Heidegger claims "what is primarily 'true' — that is, uncovering - is 
Dasein. 'Truth' is the second sense does not mean Being-covering (uncovering), but 
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Being-uncovered (uncoveredness)". [SZ 220, BT 262] The most primordial meaning 
of truth is nothing but the disclosedness of Dasein's Being as care. 
Sticking to this meaning of truth, Heidegger revisits the meaning of "being-true" of 
assertion, proposition or judgment. Instead of defining true proposition as 
correspondence of proposition and things, Heidegger claims "true" proposition refers 
to the proposition that uncovers beings. This apparently obscure claim is illustrated 
clearly by Heidegger's own example in Being and Time. In the assertion "the 
hammer is too heavy", a being~~the hammer~is shown as something ready-to-hand, 
i.e. as something useful to Dasein in its surrounding world. Assertion is true 
insomuch as it uncovers beings as they are. This uncovering function is called 
"pointing out" (Aufzeigen). Besides uncovering beings, assertion has the function of 
preserving this uncoveredness. This is shown by the fact that what is asserted can be 
spoke again, handed down from tradition in language, etc. Regarding true assertion 
as containing these two functions, the assertion itself is also taken as something 
ready-to-hand. The activity of making assertions, judgments, propositions are 
primarily as something useful in Dasein's everyday life. Theoretical assertion such as 
"the hammer is 5kg heavy" appears when Dasein is abstracted from its surrounding 
world. In this kind of assertion, the hammer, the being that the assertion talks about is 
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being taken as something present-at-hand, as an object that Dasein's care is kept in a 
deficient mode. Hence, the assertion itself is also taken as something present-at-hand. 
Two present-at-hand beings, i.e. assertion and the hammer, can then be compared. 
Therefore, any prepositional truth as correspondence is founded on a priori 
disclosure of beings in Dasein's world. For Heidegger, traditional conception of truth 
is not false, but only lacks an insight into its own genuine foundation in Dasein. 
4.2.3 Transcendence as Ground of Truth 
"Being true" of assertion is founded on ontic and ontological truth. Ontic truth 
reveals beings in their Being, while ontological truth reveal Being of beings. As 
Heidegger maintains consistently in his life, Being is not any beings at all, but Being 
is always the Being of beings. Thus, Being and beings differs from each other while 
essentially belongs together. This complex relation between Being and beings is 
called by Heidegger ontological difference {Ontologische Unterschield): 
Ontic and Onotological truth each concern, in different ways, beings in 
their Being, and Being of beings. They belong essentially together on the 
grounds of their relation to the distinction between Being and beings 
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(ontological difference). The essence of truth in general, which is thus 
necessarily forked in terms of the ontic and the ontological, is possible 
only together with the irruption of this distinction. [PM 106] 
This distinction is first introduced in the treatise On the Essence of Ground. However, 
similar thought has already emerged in Being and Time when Heidegger formulates 
the question of Being. Ontological difference is most fundamental since it is 
presupposed by all kinds of comportments of Dasein, prior to any manifestation of 
beings. Any understanding of beings as beings requires Dasein's understanding-of-
Being. Ontic truth and ontological truth, which as unconcealment of beings in Being 
and Being of beings respectively, are thus one and the same happening. If the essence 
of truth presupposes ontological difference, then there lies in Dasein the capacity for 
understanding such difference. Indeed, Heidegger claims transcendence of Dasein is 
the happening that makes ontological difference accessible to Dasein. Hence, 
Heidegger writes: 
And if what is distinctive about Dasein indeed lies in the fact that in 
understanding Being it comports itself towards being, that potential 
for distinguishing in which the ontological difference becomes 
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factical must have sunk the roots of its own possibility in the ground 
of the essence of Dasein. By way of anticipation, we shall call this 
ground of ontological difference the transcendence of Dasein. [PM 
106] 
In transcendence, Dasein projects forward from actuality to possibility. As Dasein 
exists, it surpasses all actual beings and discloses a world of possibilities which 
rather belongs to the level of Being. "The world: a nothing, no being - and yet 
something; nothing of beings—but Being." [MFL 195]. Dasein certainly does not 
create ontological difference according to his own will, but ontological difference 
manifests to Dasein as transcendence happens. If truth pertains to manifestation of 
beings, which presupposes ontological difference, then any such manifestation is 
possible only on the basis of transcendence of Dasein. 
Therefore, it is now clear that truth of proposition is not primarily grounded on some 
properties belonging to proposition. Instead, any prepositional truth has its ground at 
truth of beings and Being, which is further founded on transcendence of Dasein. 
Transcendence thus can be understood as a disclosing process that lets beings and 
Being manifest to Dasein. And this is what Heidegger really attempts to bring us to 
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by his discussion of transcendence and truth. 
4.4 Transcendence and Ground 
So far, we have explained the meaning of transcendence and its relation to a 
primordial kind of truth. Only after this lengthy preparation, can we first come to 
Heidegger's direct treatment of ground. For Heidegger, as what we have mentioned 
in Chapter 1，the problem of ground cannot be answered by positing particular beings 
as an ultimate ground of beings. Instead of asking "what is ground", Heidegger in 
fact asked “how is the meaning of ground originates in Dasein", or simply "the origin 
of ground in general" [PM 127]. 
Hence, in contrast to ordinary concept of ground, Heidegger suggests a primordial 
concept of grounding {grunden) in On the Essence of Ground. Grounding is not any 
act of determining particular beings as ultimate ground, but the primordial happening 
that renders any ground possible. It is the condition of possibility for any 
understanding of ground, no matter ground is taken as God, Res Cogitans, Arche or 
so forth. In this sense, grounding can be claimed as the ground of ground. For 
Heidegger, grounding is indeed rooted in the transcendence of Dasein. If positing 
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particular beings as ground presupposes certain beings have already manifested in a 
world for Dasein, then it is precisely transcendence of Dasein makes this possible. 
Hence, Heidegger re-interprets the concept of transcendence, in relation to the 
problem of ground, as a process of grounding. 
4.4.1 Transcendence as primordial grounding 
The essence of ground is the transcendental springing forth of grounding, 
strewn threefold into projection of world, adsorption within beings, and 
ontological grounding of beings. [PM 132] 
Transcendence as the process of grounding consists of three moments. First, 
projection of the for-the-sake-of-which, which is called establishing {Stiften). Second, 
Dasein's projection is always confined by a situation which attuned by beings, which 
is called taking up a basis (Bodennehmen); third, as a world opens up in the co-
operation of first and second moment but not yet related to beings, Dasein lets 
particular beings manifest as ground in what Heidegger calls grounding of something 
{Begrunden). These three moments do not happen one after one. It is not the case that 
Dasein first projects, and then falls into a situation afterwards. They always belong 
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together as a unitary phenomenon. 
Discussion of the three moments of grounding appears nowhere else except in On the 
Essence of Ground. However, a closer look will notice that these moments are not 
something alien to early Heidegger's thought as a whole. Indeed, they correspond to 
understanding, Befindlichkeit, and discourse in Being and Time, which are the three 
components of Dasein as disclosedness. In later writing immediately after Being and 
Time, they are included in the concept of transcendence. Hence, although these three 
moments of grounding are hardly further elaborated by Heidegger, the existential 
involved in each of them are familiar enough. 
Considered from the three unitary moments of grounding, transcendence renders any 
why-question and search for ground possible. 
In the projection of world an excess of possibility is given with respect to 
which, in our being pervaded by those (actual) beings that press around 
us as we find ourselves, the "why" springs forth. [PM 130] 
Transcendence is characterized by projection of world. But what does it mean giving 
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an "excess of possibility"? And how does this "excess of possibility" give rise to 
why-question? We may approach these questions by considering the fundamental 
forms of why-questions. We ask: why this but not that? Why in this way but not in 
that way? Why are there beings at all but not nothing? To make these questions 
possible at all only if we do not take beings as merely actual. Insofar as beings are 
regarded as one possibility among others, then do we ask why this being but not that 
being. Excess of possibility implies actual beings can always happens otherwise. 
With understanding of such excess of possibility of beings, Dasein starts to search 
for ground that explains why things do not happen otherwise. If why-questions and 
search for ground are founded on a prior understanding of possibility, and any 
understanding of possibility is founded on transcendence from actuality to possibility, 
then why-questions no doubt presuppose transcendence of Dasein. 
To ask why-question is to search for a ground. Therefore, ground also springs forth 
in transcendence. If certain beings are understood as ground, they have to enter 
Dasein's world and let themselves be encountered first. And world-entry is grounded 
in transcendence as projection of world. Consequently, transcendence becomes the 
grounding process of all grounds. 
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This understanding of Being first makes possible the "why". This means, 
however, that it already contains the ultimate and primordial originary 
answer to all questioning. As altogether the most antecedent answer, our 
understanding of Being provides the ultimate and primary grounding of 
things. In such understanding of Being, transcendence as such grounds 
things. [PM 130] 
Hence, by claiming transcendence as primordial grounding, Heidegger does not aim 
at giving a universal conception of ground once and for all. Transcendence is 
precisely the primordial happening that lets different conception of ground occurs. 
“The essence of ground differentiates itself into diverse sorts of "grounds" (e.g. the 
four cause), not because there are different beings, but because the metaphysical 
essence of Dasein as transcending has the possibility of first establishing world-
access for diverse beings." [MFL 214] For instance, in Aristotle, ground is 
understood in terms of four causes, namely formal cause, material cause, efficient 
cause and final cause. What Heidegger criticizes is not the correctness of these 
causes, but their un-discussed possibility of unity. Four causes as four different 
modes of ground are founded on Dasein's prior access to different beings that 
manifest themselves in its world. In turn, the condition of possibility of four causes 
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lies at Dasein's transcendence and understanding-of-Being. 
Consequently, transcendence is the process making possible all grounds. However, 
what is the significance of such an explanation? What do we gain by just grasping 
the meaning of ground rooting in transcendence of Dasein, if we can neither affirm 
nor deny the validity of particular being as ultimate ground? Does Heidegger just 
shift the real problem? Indeed, by attributing primordial grounding to the 
phenomenon of transcendence, we shall obtain a striking challenge to the traditional 
concept of ultimate ground as such. This challenge can be seen in Heidegger's 
relating of freedom to ground. 
4.4.2 Freedom and the Abyss of Ground 
At first glance, freedom and ground may seem in contradiction. For ultimate ground 
is never freely chosen. For example, in Descartes, Res Cogitans as the Archimedean 
point of knowledge is claimed to be the sole ground. This single ultimate ground is 
guaranteed by his rigorous method of universal doubt. One cannot just simply choose 
another ground for himself. In this way, ultimate ground in its essence should expel 
the possibility of freedom. However, through analysis of transcendence as grounding 
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of all grounds, Heidegger claims all grounds indeed results from freedom. 
In Heidegger, the concept of freedom is radically different from traditional usages in 
philosophy. Freedom usually means spontaneous action of someone, in contrast to 
coerced action. For instance, Kant explains human freedom as a kind of causality that 
differs from causality in nature. However, what Heidegger means by freedom 
distances from the concept of causality. Freedom is not spontaneous action, but a 
more primordial phenomenon that renders both spontaneous action and coerced 
action possible. Even coerced action presupposes this freedom. "Only a free being 
can be unfree." [MFL 191] Then what does freedom mean? 
Yet whatever, in accordance with its essence, casts something like 
the “for the sake o f project!vely before it [...] is that which we call 
freedom. Surpassing in the direction of world is freedom itself. 
Surpassing in the direction of world is freedom itself. [PM 126] 
Not to our surprise, freedom is identified with projection of world, and thus 
transcendence. "As free, Dasein is world-projection." [MFL 192] Therefore, freedom 
is not a definite property of Dasein sometimes possess but sometimes not, instead, 
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Dasein as being-in-the-world is freedom. "Being-in-the-world is accordingly nothing 
other than freedom, freedom no longer understood as spontaneity but as defined by 
the formulation of Dasein's metaphysical essence, which we have described." [MFL 
192] 
To stress transcendence as freedom is to stress its projection of possibility. As free, 
Dasein projects to its for-the-sake-of-which, transcends what it is now and what is 
was before, understanding itself in terms of its possibility. Only after possibilities are 
disclosed in freedom, can Dasein exists this possibility or that possibility. Suppose 
someone chooses to read a book in his bedroom now, this implies that he chooses the 
possibility of reading rather than possibilities of sleeping, listening to music, 
watching television, etc. This is a free choice if he spontaneously chooses to read; 
this is an unfree choice if he is forced to read and gives up other possibilities. No 
matter his choice is free or unfree, these possibilities must be given to him in his 
world beforehand. Otherwise, he has no choice at all. For Heidegger, freedom is 
nothing but a disclosure of possibilities, which is more primordial than free or unfree 
choice. 
Just as projection is always thrown, freedom is always finite. That means the 
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possibilities disclosed in freedom are necessarily limited. Dasein is thrown into 
definite possibilities. Dasein's choice is always limited by the finite possibilities that 
disclosed in its world. 
If Dasein, transcendence, and freedom points to one and the same phenomenon, then 
freedom's relation to ground will come to light. 
The ground that springs forth in transcending folds back upon 
freedom itself, and freedom as origin itself becomes "ground". 
Freedom is ground of ground. [...] [PM 134] 
Though in transcendence, particular being springs forth as particular ground actually. 
However, particular ontic ground is at bottom only a possibility of Dasein rather than 
something merely actual. The possibility of taking particular being as ground 
presupposes that such possibility is disclosed as in Dasein's world. Any ground will 
then presupposes finite freedom. If someone, like Leibniz, takes God as an ultimate 
ground, this is possible only such possibility is disclosed in his world. But why this 
possibility but not that possibility disclosed for that particular Dasein is a question 
eventually cannot be explained. If freedom is the ground of all grounds, then it is a 
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ground which is groundless. 
As this ground, however, freedom is the abyss of ground (Ab-grund) in 
Dasein. [...] rather, in its essence, freedom places Dasein, as potentiality 
for Being, in possibilities that gape open before its finite choice, i.e. 
within its destiny. [PM 134] 
Finally, we have reached the most challenging conclusion by the whole problem of 
ground in early Heidegger. By tracing back to the condition of possibilities of ground 
in Dasein, Heidegger reveals that ultimate ground is indeed impossible. Any kind of 
ultimate ground posited by particular Dasein is founded on the disclosure of 
possibilities in its world, which cannot be explained further. Therefore, instead of 
giving a metaphysical explanation of ultimate ground, Heidegger carried out a 
phenomenological description of how ground stands with Dasein. 
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Conclusion 
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The search for an ultimate ground is one of the main problems in the history of 
philosophy. Different answers are attempted by different philosophers with the same 
tendency to look for a final explanation of everything. However, from our discussion 
of the problem of ground in early Heidegger, it is doubtful that whether there is such 
an ultimate ground which is absolute and universal. 
Instead of searching for an ultimate ground, early Heidegger inquires into the 
condition of possibility of ground in Dasein. Any kinds of being posited as ultimate 
ground is rooted in Dasein's imderstanding-of-Being. Understanding-of-Being in turn 
presupposes the transcendence of Dasein, which pertains to the phenomenon that by 
relating to its possibility, Dasein surpasses from beings as whole towards the world. 
In transcendence, beings enter into Dasein's world and manifest themselves. 
Transcendence, as the primordial happening that makes manifestations of beings 
possible, is then considered as the primordial grounding of Dasein. Only on top of 
accessing to the world, beings can be further determined as the ground for something 
in Dasein. However, Dasein is always thrown into a world that it does not choose. It 
never be fully explained why this particular Dasein situates in such world. This 
implies the ground of ultimate ground in Dasein is eventually groundless. 
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On top of this thesis, there are three aspects that worth conducting further research. 
First, one may further clarify Heidegger's terminologies which are constituted with 
the prefix Grund-. These terminologies include Grundstimmung (fundamental 
attunement), Grundbegriff (fundamental concept), Grundprobleme (basic problems), 
Grundlegen (laying of the ground), etc.^i They appear at the period between 1927 
and 1930, which is also the period that Heidegger uses the concept of ground most 
frequently. Their etymological linkage is blurred by inconsistent translations of 
Grund- into fundamental, basic, ground, foundation, etc. As we have shown in our 
discussion, the concept of ground in Heidegger between 1927 and 1930 basically 
refers to the transcendence of Dasein, i.e. being-in-the-world. If we seek to 
understand these terminologies systematically, we have to explain them by relating 
them to Dasein as being-in-the-world instead of rendering Grund- in a traditional 
sense. 
Second, one may further articulate how Heidegger transits from his early thought to 
his later thought with the help of the concept of ground. The question of Being is the 
question concerns Heidegger's whole life but approached in different ways in his 
41 Grundstimmung and Grundbegriff can be seen in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics] 
Grundprobleme is part of the title of The Basic Problems of Phemoneology; And Grundlegen appears 
in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics when Heidegger interprets Kant's project as the laying of the 
ground o f metaphysics. The English translations of these terminologies are taken from the English 
translation of the corresponding works I used. 
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early period and later period. In early Heidegger the question is approached by 
Dasein analysis while the later Heidegger abandons it for the reason of Onto-theo-
logy, which seeks to explain Being with resort to a particular but supreme being. 
This change may be partly due to the obscure relation between Being and being. We 
can see that Heidegger continues to search for an appropriate language to articulate 
Being and its relation to beings. Traditional philosophical terms like "substance", 
"nature", "God" etc are not suitable to describe Being since they easily treats Being 
as if it is a being. To explain Being from Dasein's understanding-of-Being may also 
be explaining Being by a particular being, namely Dasein. Being unsatisfied with his 
early approach but still on the way to his later thought, Heidegger often uses the 
concept of ground to describe Being between 1928 and 1930. Being is the ground of 
beings. Hence, in order to understand more fully why Heidegger transits from his 
early thought to his later thought, ground may be regarded as an important transitory 
concept to deal with. 
Third, one may further investigate the consequence of renouncing an ultimate ground. 
If we agree with Heidegger that there is indeed no final reason or absolute standard 
as long as we are being-in-the-world, then we will easily fall into the danger of 
nihilism. Such nihilism has already emerged when Nietzsche announced "God is 
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dead" and its effect prolongs to contemporary post-modem society. The lack of 
absolute standard leaves ethical and cultural conflicts irresoluble. 
A lively example of this consequence comes from Heidegger's political engagement 
with Nazi's party. In 1933，Heidegger was elected as the Rector of University of 
Freiburg and joined the Nazi party. The connection between his notorious political 
position and his philosophical thought becomes an issue for discussion.42 Although 
there is nothing obvious in Heidegger's own philosophy implies joining the Nazi's 
party, there is also nothing resists him. The renounce of ultimate ground and absolute 
standard gives us no final reason to claim such political engagement wrong. As a 
consequence, do terrorists have their own grounds in their world that we could not 
claim their deeds are evil at all? How cross cultural communications are possible? To 
what extant do Daseins exist in a shared world? These are pressing questions not 
only concerns Heidegger's philosophy but also our contemporary world. 
42 For details, please refer to Heidegger, philosophy, Nazism by J. Young or Heidegger and Nazism 
by Victor Farias. 
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Glossary: 
English-German Translations of Terminologies in Heidegger 
Abgrund - Abyss of ground 
Aufgehen - Absorption 
Aufzeigen - Pointing out 
Begriinden - Grounding of something 
Besorge - Concern 
Bewandtnis - Involvement 
Bodennehmen - Taking up a basis 
Entdecken - Uncover 
Entwurf 一 Projection 
Erschlossenheit - Disclosedness 
Existentiziell - Existentiell 
Existenz 一 Existence 
Existenzial -- Existentiale 
Freiheit - Freedom 
Fundamentalontologie - Fundamental Ontology 
Fursorge - Solicitude 
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Geworfenheit - Throwness 
Gleichursprunglich 一 Equiprimordial 
Grund - Ground 
Griinden - Grounding 
In-der-Welt-sein — Being-in-the-world 
Jemeinigkeit - In-each-case-mineness 
Ontische -- Ontic 
Ontologie - Ontology 
Ontologische 一 Ontological 
Seiendes - Beings 
Sein - Being 
Seinkdnnen - Potentiality-for-Being 
Seinverstdndnies - Understanding-of-Being 
Selbstheit-S^Xihood 
Sinn - Meaning 
Sorge - Care 
Stiften - Establishing 
Transcendenz - Transcendence 
Umgang - Dealing 
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Umsicht - Circumspection 
Umwelt - Surrounding world 
Urspriinglich 一 Primordial 
Verhalten - Comportment 
Verstehen - Understanding 
Verweisung 一 Reference 
Vorhandenheit - Presence-at-hand 
Wahrheit - Truth 
融 - W o r l d 
Weltbilden - World-forming 
Welteingang - World-entry 
Weltish 一 Worldly 
Weltlichkeit - Worldlihood 
Wesen - Essence 
Wofur - For-which 
Worum-willen - For-the-sake-of-which 
Wozu - Towards-which 
Zeitlichkeit - Temporality 
Zeug ~ Tools 
1 2 8 
Zuhandenheit - Readiness-to-hand 
Zu-Sein - To-be 
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